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CHARLES WILLIAM EMIL MILLER

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, HERMANN COLLITZ, TENNEY FRANK,  
WILFRED P. MUSTARD, D. M. ROBINSON

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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## I.—ST. AUGUSTINE'S METHOD OF COMPOSING AND DELIVERING SERMONS.

### I. INTRODUCTION.

This article is the outgrowth of an investigation suggested to the author several years ago by Dean A. F. West of the Graduate School of Princeton University. At that time it was the author's intention to investigate only those sermons of Augustine on the Gospel and Epistle of Saint John, a short summary of which the author published in the Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association of 1916. However, on looking over other sermons, he found the same characteristics existing generally throughout, and there seemed no good reason for confining the investigation to a small proportion of the discourses which did not differ particularly from all the rest. Accordingly the scope of the study was enlarged, and all the sermons of Augustine were examined with the present subject in view.

Throughout this study the author makes constant use of the terms "extempore" and "strictly extempore." By "extempore" he means that the sermons were probably given after some previous meditation on the subject, but with no extensive preparation. By "strictly extempore" he means that the sermons were given unexpectedly and without any preparation of any kind.

Among the church fathers, the terms *sermones*, *homiliae*, *tractatus*, *enarrationes*, etc., were used interchangeably for the

most part;<sup>1</sup> and in this study, "sermons," "homilies," "trac-tates," "commentaries," etc., are employed in like manner.

## II. THE HITHERTO ACCEPTED VIEW.

The sermons of Saint Augustine have been divided by the Benedictine editors<sup>1a</sup> (Th. Blampin, P. Constant, and others) into five classes, of which the first contains eighty-three upon various passages of the Old Testament, the second eighty-eight upon the great festivals of the year, the third sixty-nine upon the festivals of the saints, the fourth twenty-three upon a variety of subjects, and the fifth thirty-one of doubtful authenticity.<sup>2</sup> To this number should be added the explanations of the Psalms (*enarrationes in psalmos*) and of the Gospel and Epistle of John (*in Johannis evangelium tractatus 124, in Johannis epistolas tractatus 19*), besides a small number distributed throughout this collection, and others since discovered and published. Altogether there is left us from Augustine a corpus of about four hundred sermons.

It has been said, more or less categorically, that Augustine wrote most of his sermons before he delivered them, that he dictated many to be read thereafter, and that he delivered some extemporaneously, these last being taken down by stenographers (*notarii*) in the church, and later transcribed into longhand.<sup>3</sup> Manifestly the difference between writing and dictating sermons is very slight, since it is the difference merely between having some one put your careful thought in writing for you, and performing the manual labor yourself.<sup>4</sup> Thus the current opinion resolves itself into the belief that Augustine prepared and wrote his sermons carefully before he delivered them, and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ferrarius, *De Ritu Concionum Sacrarum*, 1, 2.

<sup>1a</sup> Paris 1679-1700, 11 folio volumes; Migne, P. L. 32-47, 1845-1849.

<sup>2</sup> Many other sermons have since been identified as genuine; cf. Ceillier, *Histoire des Auteurs sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, 9, 828; Morin, *Revue Bénédictine*, passim.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Benedictine edition, introduction to sermons; Ceillier, op. cit., 9, 235; Morin, *Textes Études et Découvertes*, 255; Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*, 430; Teuffel, *Roemische Literatur*, 3<sup>a</sup>, 375; Degert, *Quid ad mores ingeniaque Afrorum*\*\*\*, 17, and others.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 22, 953; Ferrarius, *De Ritu Concionum Sacrarum*, 208.

only on rare occasions, generally due to some fortuitous circumstance, spoke extempore. We pass over the idea expressed occasionally that Augustine may have written or dictated his sermons after having preached them, because this is a mere supposition, and the character of such sermons would not differ especially from discourses written before delivery.

The chief source for the belief that Augustine wrote many of his sermons is the last sentence of the *Retractations*.<sup>5</sup> This passage, however, involves a faulty text, which according to the preferred reading gives no support whatsoever to this opinion. The passage as given by the Benedictine edition and as utilized to support the idea in question is:

Haec opera XCIII in libris CCXXXII me dictasse recolui, quando haec retractavi . . . , atque ipsam eorum retractationem in libris II edidi . . . antequam epistulas et sermones in populum, *alios dictatos alios a me dictos, retractare coepissem.*

The latest edition of the Retractions by Knoll,<sup>6</sup> whose new study of the MSS. has been warmly supported by Harnack,<sup>7</sup> makes a very important change in this text. Instead of *alios dictatos*, Knoll reads *alias dictatas*. That is instead of saying, "before I began to look over my letters and sermons to the people, some (of the sermons) dictated and others (of the sermons) spoken," Augustine says, "before I began to look over my letters and sermons to the people, the former (the letters) dictated and the latter (the sermons) spoken."<sup>8</sup> This new rendering would exclude any of Augustine's sermons as having been read before their delivery, and would stamp his discourses as being essentially of one sort. In writing his letters, Augustine, being a

<sup>5</sup> 2, 93, 2.

\*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Wien, 36, 1902.

<sup>1</sup>Die Retraktionen Augustins, Sitz. der Berliner Akademie, 1905, 1096.

\* This use of *alius* for *alter* is rare in classical Latin, but common in the speech of the people of every period. After the classical period, however, *alius* for *alter* became common in the literature also, e. g. Plin. nat. 11, 59 *duo genera apum, aliarum . . . aliarum . . .*, and Liv. I, 21, 6, *Ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia via, ille bello hic pace, civitatem auxerunt*. This usage continued into the Latin of the church fathers. Cf. also Fr. Stolz u. J. H. Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik* 629.

very busy man and following the custom of his time, made use of stenographers;<sup>9</sup> on the other hand, he spoke his sermons unhampered, and did not read his discourses after having previously written or dictated them.<sup>10</sup>

The only other possible evidence that Augustine ever wrote a sermon before or after its delivery is in the *De Doctrina Christiana* (4, 29), and in the *De Trinitate* (15, 48). In the former passage, Augustine says: "Sunt sane quidem qui bene pronuntiare possunt, quid autem pronuntient excogitare non possunt. Quod si ab aliis sumant eloquenter sapienterque conscriptum, memoriae quae commendent, atque ad populum proferant; si eam personam gerunt, non improbe faciunt." Why should we in any way believe from such a passage that Augustine wrote any of his sermons before or after having delivered them? To be sure it shows that Augustine was willing to have his sermons used by others, and, we may presume, was willing to see his discourses put in writing for that purpose, but this passage gives no more ground for saying that Augustine wrote his sermons than does the mere fact of the existence of his sermons in writing today. Why could not Augustine, after he had delivered his discourses, have had them transcribed into longhand from shorthand copies made by the *notarius* at the very moment of their delivery?

In his work on the Trinity,<sup>11</sup> Augustine mentions a subject already discussed in a sermon which was written up after its delivery. Here, as in the last sentence of the *Retractations*, he speaks of the sermon as *dictum*, and here, as apparently he does elsewhere,<sup>12</sup> Augustine uses *conscribere* to signify the transcribing of the *notarius*'s shorthand copy into longhand. Granting

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Chapter VI.

<sup>10</sup> It is astonishing that Kroll and Skutsch (*Teuffel, Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, 3<sup>e</sup>, 440, 12) should quote this sentence from the *Retractations* in its revised form to support their statement (i. e. the view accepted hitherto) that some of Augustine's sermons were dictated and some were written. They are apparently unaware of the importance of the change in reading, and far from accurate in interpreting the earlier text.

<sup>11</sup> 15, 48. *Id quod de hac re in sermone quodam proferendo ad aures populi Christiani diximus, dictumque conscripsimus.*

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Chapter VI.



that in this case Augustine himself performed the manual labor, which is most unlikely, the passage does not mean that Augustine sat down after he delivered the sermon and wrote it up as best he could from memory, or from any notes from which he may have preached. The sermon, as will be seen later, bears too many striking marks of spontaneity and naturalness to admit of such a composition.

Having, we hope, thus disposed of any belief that Augustine, according to existing evidence, wrote sermons before or after he delivered them, we are ready to take up the main subject of this investigation: How did Augustine compose and deliver his sermons, and incidentally how have these discourses come down to us?

### III. THE COMPOSITION OF SERMONS AS REVEALED IN THE WORKS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS AND NEARLY CONTEMPORANEOUS CHURCH FATHERS.

The early fathers of the church used all of the various ways of composing and delivering sermons.<sup>1</sup> It often happened that bishops, through being sick or in exile, or from other causes, were unable to fulfill their special duty of preaching.<sup>2</sup> Rather than let any of their subordinates preach for them, they frequently would write sermons in the form of letters to be read to the various congregations. Athanasius, John Chrysostom, and Cyprian, while in exile, all wrote sermons in the form of letters for their people. The second letter of Clemens Romanus, the first letter of Peter, that of James, as well as the Epistle to the Hebrews are sermons in letter form.<sup>3</sup>

Sermons were sometimes written by one person and delivered by another, either from memory or by the use of a written copy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ferrarius, *op. cit.* 105, 172.

<sup>2</sup> In the earlier centuries of the church, only bishops had the right to preach. Later, however, they extended this power to certain of their priests. The bishops of Rome clung to this privilege most zealously, and looked with a bad eye upon such as delegated this right to their subordinates. Cf. Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrétien*, 163.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius* 1; 438, 451, 487; Norden, *op. cit.* 618.

<sup>4</sup> Ferrarius, *op. cit.* 203.

Thus Cyril of Alexandria says in the prologue of his twenty-second paschal sermon, "Not at all with a desire to display our eloquence have we put forth this little sermon or rather letter, but because of the old tradition were we induced to do it."<sup>5</sup> Cassianus confirms what we would naturally conclude from these words, by saying specifically that Cyril's predecessor wrote sermons to be circulated and delivered by others. "In the region of Aegypt," he says, "that old custom is preserved of sending letters of the pontifex of Alexandria to all the churches. With these letters the beginning of Lent and Easter is ordained, not only throughout the cities, but also in all the monasteries. . . . In accordance with this custom . . . the blessed letters of Theophilus, bishop of the aforementioned city, were passed around."<sup>6</sup> For a similar purpose, we read that Gaudentius, bishop of Brixia, sent his tractates to Benevolus,<sup>7</sup> that Antiochus Monachus sent several homilies to Euthasius,<sup>8</sup> and that Gregory the Great sent two codices of discourses to Secundinus.<sup>9</sup> Pope Gregory the Great often had his sermons read to the people by *notarii*, as we learn from the beginning of his letter to Secundinus, when he writes, "During the holy sacrifices of the mass, I have expounded forty readings of the Holy Gospel which are usually read in this church on certain days. And the explanations of some, dictated previously, were recited by a *notarius* in the presence of the people. The interpretations of others, I myself delivered before the people, and my words were taken down as I spoke."<sup>10</sup> Also in homily 21, Gregory says, "Regarding my preaching, my dear brethren, I have been accustomed to speak to you, after having previously had my words taken down from dictation. However, since I myself am unable to read these because of a weak stomach, I notice that some of you are less willing to give attention. Wherefore I now intend, contrary to my wont, to bring myself to explain the reading of the Holy Gospel in the mass, not through dictation, but by an informal talk. And as we speak,

<sup>5</sup> P. G. 77, 857.

<sup>7</sup> P. L. 20, 827.

<sup>6</sup> Collatio 10, 2; P. L. 49, 820.

<sup>8</sup> P. G. 89, 1421.

<sup>9</sup> P. L. 77, 990.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Pfeilschifter, Die authentische Ausgabe der Evangelien-Homilien Gregors des Grossen.

let it be taken down, because the voice of one talking informally stirs the sleeping heart more than the words of a reader, and, as it were, with an anxious hand, prods them to attention."<sup>11</sup> According to Gennadius, Cyril of Alexandria wrote many sermons which he caused to be sent to all the bishops of Greece, and which they memorized and delivered as their own.<sup>12</sup>

Caesarius of Arles played a very exceptional role as a composer of homilies for others. The contemporary biographers of Caesarius all declare that during his episcopate of more than half a century, he was not content to speak himself nearly every day, but his zeal for the word of God and the instruction of the Christian people, brought him to compose and have composed many collections of sermons for the use of other preachers. These compilations, of which he always had a supply on hand, he not only gave out to willing ecclesiastics, but he even forced the unwilling to take them as they passed through Arles. Moreover, he even exported some to the farthestmost parts of the Gauls, Italy, and Spain. These collections usually consisted of extracts from Augustine, Ambrose, and other fathers, arranged and put within the grasp of the people, with bits of material entirely original which Caesarius scattered throughout, particularly at the beginning and end.<sup>13</sup>

Throughout the *De Doctrina Christiana*, Augustine assumes speaking, and that, too, largely extempore, and not reading, as the proper mode of delivering a sermon, and yet he makes allowances for those who have not the ability to compose well, and who accordingly make use of the composition of others. He tells us that a preacher may deliver to the people what has been written by a man more eloquent than himself.<sup>14</sup> He says too, "But whether a man is going to address the people or dictate what others will deliver or read to the people, he ought to pray God to put into his mouth a suitable discourse. . . . Those, again, who are to deliver what others compose for them

<sup>11</sup> Cf. also Joannes Diaconus, *Gregorii Vita*, 2, 18 and 4, 74.

<sup>12</sup> Gennadius, *De illustribus ecclesiae scriptoribus*, 58: Cyrillus Alexandrinae ecclesiae episcopus homilias composuit plurimas, quae ad declamandum a Graecis memoriae commendantur.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Arnold, *Caesarius von Arelate*; Morin, *Revue Bénédictine*, passim.

<sup>14</sup> *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4, 62.

ought, before they receive their discourse, to pray for those who are preparing it; and when they have received it, they ought to pray both that they themselves may deliver it well, and that those to whom they address it, may give ear."<sup>15</sup> In speaking thus of those who will deliver or who will read, Augustine of course has in mind those who will memorize and then deliver sermons, and those who will merely read what others have composed. Surely it is not to be conjectured from these remarks that Augustine is making a defence of a practice in which he himself sometimes indulged. He is clearly making a concession to a method of discoursing, which is wholly out of place and in no way conformable to the principles that he himself lays down in his discussion of the art of preaching (i. e. in the *De Doctrina Christiana*).

In Atticus, bishop of Constantinople, we have a church father who; at least for a period of his activity, wrote out and then memorized his sermons before he delivered them.

The great minds of the patristic floruit (fourth and fifth centuries), however, usually preached extempore, or if not extempore in the strictest sense, after some meditation on the subject. Regarding Origen, Eusebius says: "At this time, as the faith extended and our doctrine was proclaimed boldly before all, Origen, being as they say, over sixty years old, and having gained great facility by his long practice, very properly permitted his public discourses to be taken down by stenographers, a thing which he had never before allowed."<sup>16</sup>

Cyril of Jerusalem likewise, on certain occasions at least, spoke extemporaneously. All of his Catecheses have the characteristics of extempore discourses, and, besides, the first of these sermons has the heading, "To those who are to be enlightened, delivered extempore at Jerusalem, as an introductory lecture to those who had come forward for Baptism."<sup>17</sup>

The homilies of John Chrysostom have many evidences of being extemporized discourses. They contain many utterances which are due to fortuitous and unexpected happenings, such

<sup>15</sup> *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4, 63.

<sup>16</sup> *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 6, 36, P. G. 20, 596. Cf. also Rufinus, P. L. 21; Nicephorus, 5, 19.

<sup>17</sup> P. G. 33, 369.



as references to a congregation larger and noisier than usual, an unbecoming outburst of applause from the congregation, and similar things. On one occasion in particular, Socrates tells us that Chrysostom launched out on a denunciation against Epiphanius, who was just then entering the church and who, he had learned, was sent against him by the Empress Eudoxia.<sup>18</sup> The same Chrysostom, having returned from exile, was forced by his overjoyed people to take his chair in the church, whereupon he addressed them purely extemporaneously.<sup>19</sup> We also learn from Socrates that Chrysostom regularly had *notarii* in the church to take down his utterances. Socrates says, "Why need we speak of the sermons published by himself and those taken down by stenographers as he spoke, not only brilliant sermons, but very attractive ones?"<sup>20</sup>

The sermons of Severian of Gabala have all the marks of spoken and largely extemporaneous discourses. They are full of short pointed remarks, many of them suggested by immediate and accidental circumstances. Severian for a time preached in Chrysostom's church, and Chrysostom's church-stenographers very likely took his sermons down also. It may be for this very reason that many of Severian's sermons are included in the collections of homilies by Chrysostom. Indeed there are many sermons among the spuria of the latter which very likely belong to the former.<sup>21</sup>

Socrates says of Atticus, bishop of Constantinople: "Formerly, while a presbyter, he had been accustomed, after composing his sermons, to commit them to memory, and then recite them in the church; but by diligent application, he acquired confidence and made his instruction extemporaneous and eloquent. His discourses, however, were not such as to be received with much applause by his auditors, or to deserve to be committed to writing."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6, 14, P. G. 67, 705.

<sup>19</sup> Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6, 16, P. G. 67, 712; Sozomenus 8, 18, P. G. 67, 1562; Nicephorus, 83, 16, P. G. 146, 985.

<sup>20</sup> Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6, 4, P. G. 67, 672.

<sup>21</sup> We are indebted, for this information, to H. T. Weiskotten, who is at present investigating the spuria of Chrysostom in connection with his study of Severian. [But see also Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Griech. Litteraturgeschichte*, II, 2<sup>5</sup>, 1227.—C. W. E. M.]

<sup>22</sup> *Historia Ecclesiastica*, P. G. 67, 741.

Pope Faustus also preached extempore. This we learn from Sidonius Apollinaris, who wrote to him saying: "Often was it my privilege to listen as a hoarse applauder, now to your spontaneous sermons, now to your well prepared discourses, especially on those weekly feast-days in the holy church of Lyons, when you were prevailed upon to speak by your blessed colleagues."<sup>23</sup>

Jerome's tractates on the Psalms have been very carefully investigated by A. S. Pease<sup>24</sup> and G. Morin.<sup>25</sup> Professor Pease says, in summary, "To suppose that Jerome wrote out before delivery all that we have here is to believe that he wrote much that was trivial and self-evident. A view more charitable to the ability of so great a man, and equally compatible with our evidence, is to believe that we have, not his notes, but the report (shorthand or otherwise) of a hearer who wrote down, to the best of his ability, all that Jerome said, important or unimportant, but very likely lost entirely many utterances of some value while he was engaged in setting down ideas of inferior importance (a phenomenon familiar in the college lecture-room of our own day). The more careful and scholarly sermons may be due to Jerome's revision (improved by frequent erasure) of the reporter's copy."

Thus, in this brief survey of contemporaneous and nearly contemporaneous writers, we find that those who acquired fame as eloquent preachers all delivered their sermons without any written assistance of any kind. They did not write their discourses out first, and then read them, but they spoke after first giving their theme a certain amount of meditation. Very often, too, they were led by special circumstances to speak wholly without preparation of any kind.

#### IV. THE PRESENCE OF NOTARII IN THE CHURCHES TO TAKE DOWN SERMONS WHEN THEY WERE BEING DELIVERED.<sup>1</sup>

In Augustine's time stenographers were divided into three classes. The *notarii*, whose recognition as a separate class is

<sup>23</sup> 9, 3, 5.

<sup>24</sup> Journal of Biblical Literature, 26, 1907, 106-131.

<sup>25</sup> Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse, 1, 1896, 393-434; also *Études, Textes, et Découvertes*.

<sup>1</sup> Stenography as such is first definitely recognized in the history of

attributed to Clement (91-100 A. D.), wrote in shorthand from dictation or public speech, and were in the employment of church dignitaries. The *exceptores* also wrote in shorthand from dictation or public speech, and at least from the time of Augustine onward, were distinguished from the *notarii* merely by their being in the employment of state magistrates. The *librarii*, often called *amanuenses*, were regular transcribers of shorthand records into longhand. *Scriba* is the most general term for denoting a copyist of any sort and not as a rule signifying a knowledge of shorthand.<sup>2</sup>

The preservation of the homilies of the great preachers of the church, whose sermons bear such marks of spontaneity, can be satisfactorily explained only by the use of a shorthand system by men skilled in the same and present in the church for the express purpose of recording the spoken word. With any other explanation we would be giving in many cases scant credit for wisdom and thoughtfulness, and often a power of premonition and a remarkable, so to speak, histrionic sense.

There is an abundance of evidence, however, for the presence, both secret and public, of *notarii* actually at work during the delivery of sermons. We have already quoted a remark of Eusebius regarding Origen, that at sixty years of age he permitted his discourses to be taken down by stenographers.<sup>3</sup> The catechetical sermons of Cyril of Jerusalem were taken down by earnest students as they were being delivered. For at the end of lecture 18, in the older of the Munich manuscripts, we read:

Latin literature with the appearance of the so-called "Tironian notes." After Tiro, the traditional founder of the system, freedman and friend of Cicero, the men most concerned with the development of stenography were Vipsanius Philargyrus (13 B. C.), Aquila (8 B. C.), a certain Seneca, probably the philosopher Lucius Annaeus (d. 65 A. D.) and lastly Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage (d. 258 A. D.). The system apparently went out of extensive use soon after the fifth century A. C., and, following the varying fortunes of learning, was revived in Carolingian times and again developed in the scholastic period. It was with the contemporaries and close successors of Cyprian (among whom of course is Augustine, 354-430 A. D.) that Roman stenography apparently reached its most general use.

<sup>2</sup> On the general subject, cf. Navarre, *Histoire générale de la sténographie*; Zimmermann, *Geschichte der Stenographie*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Chap. II.

"Many other lectures were delivered year by year, both before Baptism and after the neophytes had been baptized. But these alone were taken down when spoken and written by some of the earnest students in the year 352 of the advent of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

In his sermon "The Last Farewell," Gregory Nazianzenus says, "Farewell, ye lovers of my discourses, in your eagerness and concourse, ye pencils seen and unseen, and thou balustrade, pressed upon by those who thrust themselves forward to hear the word."<sup>4</sup> What else can the "pencils seen and unseen" mean than *notarii*, either secret or public, who were present to take down the words of Gregory?

The various biographers of Chrysostom tell us that skilled and trained *notarii* were always present, mingled with the audience, whenever he preached. Socrates says, "How eloquent, convincing, and persuasive his sermons were, both those which were published by himself, and such as were noted down by shorthand writers as he delivered them, why should we stay to declare? Those who desire to form an adequate idea of them, must read for themselves, and will thereby derive both pleasure and profit."<sup>5</sup>

Respecting Atticus, bishop of Constantinople, we have the statement of Socrates as well as those of Cassiodorus and Nicephorus. Socrates says, "Formerly while a presbyter, he had been accustomed, after composing his sermons, to commit them to memory, and then recite them in the church: but by diligent application he acquired confidence and made his instruction extemporaneous and eloquent. His discourses, however, were not such as to be received with much applause by his auditors, or to deserve to be committed to writing."<sup>6</sup> Cassiodorus speaks more plainly regarding Atticus. He says, "Indeed at first when he was a presbyter, he wrote books and recited prepared subjects in the church. But afterwards he obtained confidence through experience, and delivered praiseworthy instruction extempore. His sermons, however, were never such as would be put in writing by hearers."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Oratio 42. P. G. 36, 492.

<sup>5</sup>Historia Ecclesiastica, 6, 4. P. G. 67, 672.

<sup>6</sup>Historia Ecclesiastica, 7, 2. P. G. 67.

<sup>7</sup>Historia Tripartita, 11, 2. P. L. 69, 1188.



Evidence for the presence of *notarii* in the church is no less striking among the Latin fathers. Gaudentius, bishop of Brixia, says in the preface of his tractates to Benevolus, "Regarding those sermons which, broken and incomplete, were taken down by stenographers present in secret, and which the useless zeal of some has presumed to collect, with those I am in no way concerned. Those, which it is well known were taken down with reckless haste, are not mine."<sup>8</sup>

The titles of the sixteenth and seventeenth sermons of this same Gaudentius give similar testimony. The title of the sixteenth reads: "In eo quod S. Episcopum prima die ordinationis ipsius quorumdam civium notarii exceperunt."<sup>9</sup> Codex Galeardus has for the heading of the seventeenth: "Tractatus eiusdem exceptus die dedicationis basilicae concilii sanctorum incipit."<sup>10</sup>

No obscure mention of the *notarii* present in the church is made by Gregory the Great. Writing to Marianus the bishop regarding his homilies on Ezekiel, he says: "The sermons which I gave on the holy prophet Ezekiel and which were taken down as I spoke to the people, I had left in suspension because of many pressing cares. But after eight years, at the request of my brothers, I decided to look on the papers of the *notarii* and as I ran over them I emended such as I was permitted through the grace of God to rescue from tribulations."<sup>11</sup>

In another connection we have already quoted part of the prologue to Gregory's forty homilies on the gospel where he mentions the *notarii* in the church taking down his sermons.<sup>12</sup> A little farther on, Gregory adds, "Because indeed some have been placed first, which are read later in the gospel and others are found last which were written before, you ought by no means to change the order, my brethren, because they are arranged just as they were spoken by me at various times, and just too as they were placed in the codices by the stenographers." Finally in a letter to the Bishop Leandorus, which he prefixed to his expositions of Job, Gregory writes as follows: "Although

<sup>8</sup> P. L. 20, 831.

<sup>9</sup> P. L. 20, 955.

<sup>10</sup> P. L. 20, 959.

<sup>11</sup> P. L. 76, 785, Preface to his homilies on Ezekiel.

<sup>12</sup> P. L. 76, 1075.

my life far surpasses the lives of those to whom I was bound to administer, I did not consider it harmful if my fluent pencil tended to the needs of men. Thus sometimes when my brothers were in my very presence, I spoke the beginning of some work; and then when I found time a little heavier on my hands I treated and dictated a later portion. And when still more time was available to me, I added much to my works, took away a little, and left a great deal as I found it; and by emending thus whatever had been taken down as I spoke I formed complete works."<sup>13</sup>

From these few selections taken at random, it is evident that it was by no means the unusual but rather the regular custom for *notarii* to be present in the important churches to take down unwritten sermons as they were being delivered.

V. AUGUSTINE'S REGULAR PRACTICE OF DELIVERING SERMONS WITHOUT ANY WRITTEN ASSISTANCE, AND SOMETIMES WITHOUT ANY PREVIOUS PREPARATION.

That part of the traditional view which declared that Augustine wrote or dictated many of his sermons has already been shown to rest on very meagre and questionable evidence.<sup>1</sup> A great deal of testimony does exist, however, as to the manner in which the Bishop of Hippo composed and delivered his discourses.

Augustine's great work on the art of preaching is his *De Doctrina Christiana*. This treatise of four books is divided into two parts, the first (books 1-3) dealing with the discovery of the true sense of the Scripture, the second (book 4) treating of its expression.

It is very noteworthy that throughout the fourth book Augustine assumes speaking and not reading as the manner of addressing a congregation. Several quotations will serve to make our point clear. Augustine says that it is lawful for a Christian teacher to use the art of rhetoric, for the art of rhetoric being available for the enforcing of either truth or falsehood, who will dare say that truth in the person of its defenders is to take

<sup>13</sup> P. L. 75, 512.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Introduction.

its stand unarmed against falsehood? Furthermore, the rules of rhetoric must be learned quickly (*celeriter*). "If, however, such ability be wanting, the rules of rhetoric are either not understood, or if, impressed on the mind with great labor, they come to be in some small measure understood, they prove of no service. For even those who have learnt them, and who speak with fluency and eloquence, *cannot always think of them when they are speaking so as to speak in accordance with them, unless they are discussing the rules themselves. Indeed, I think there are scarcely any who can do both things—that is, speak well, and, in order to do this, think of the rules of speaking while they are speaking. For we must be careful that what we have got to say does not escape us whilst we are thinking about saying it according to the rules of art.* Nevertheless, in the speeches of eloquent men, we find rules of eloquence carried out which the speakers did not think of as aids to eloquence at the time when they were speaking, whether they had ever learned them, or whether they never even met with them. For it is because they are eloquent that they exemplify these rules; it is not that they use them in order to be eloquent."<sup>2</sup>

"If the hearers need teaching, the matter treated of must be made fully known by means of narrative. On the other hand, to clear up points that are doubtful requires reasoning and exhibition of proofs. If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches and upbraidings, and all other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary."<sup>3</sup>

"Now it is specially necessary for the man who is bound to speak wisely, even though he cannot speak eloquently, to retain in memory the words of Scripture. For the more he discerns the poverty of his own speech, the more he ought to draw on the riches of the Scripture, so that what he says in his own words he may prove by the words of Scripture, and he himself, though small and weak in his own words, may gain strength and power from the confirming testimony of great men. For

<sup>2</sup> 4, 3 and 4.<sup>3</sup> 4, 6.

his proof gives pleasure when he cannot please by his mode of speech."<sup>4</sup>

"And this (perspicuity of style) must be insisted on as necessary to our being understood not only in conversation, whether with one person or with several, but much more in the case of a speech delivered in public: for in conversation anyone has the power of asking a question; but when all are silent that one may be heard, and all faces are turned attentively upon him, it is neither customary nor decorous for a person to ask a question about what he does not understand; and on this account the speaker ought to be especially careful to give assistance to those who cannot ask it. *Now a crowd anxious for instruction generally shows by its movements if it understands what is said, and until some indication of this sort be given, the subject discussed ought to be turned over and over, and put in every shape and form and variety of expression, a thing which cannot be done by men who are repeating words prepared beforehand and committed to memory. As soon, however, as the speaker has ascertained that what he says is understood, he ought either to bring his address to a close or pass on to another point. For if a man gives pleasure when he throws light upon points on which people wish instruction, he becomes wearisome when he dwells at length upon things that are already well known, especially when men's expectations were fixed on having the difficulties of the passage removed.*"<sup>5</sup>

In the last part of the *De Doctrina Christiana*,<sup>6</sup> Augustine mentions those who memorize or simply read the speeches of others, but he does so entirely as a condescension. He says in part that there are some men who have a good delivery, but cannot compose anything to deliver. Now it is permissible for such men to take what has been written with wisdom and eloquence by others, and commit it to memory and deliver it to the people, provided they do it openly. In this way, he says, many become preachers of the truth, which is very desirable, but not many become teachers; for in reality they are all delivering the discourses which only one real teacher has composed.

Throughout his work *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, Augustine

<sup>4</sup> 4, 8.

<sup>5</sup> 4, 25.

<sup>6</sup> 4, 29 and 30. Cf. Chapter II.



speaks of the manner of preaching to be employed in addressing the uninstructed. Here too he always assumes speaking, naturally extempore, as the proper method of preaching in the church.

Thus in discussing the fact that it often happens that a discourse which gives pleasure to the hearer is distasteful to the speaker, he says, "Indeed with me too, it is almost always the fact that my speech displeases myself. For I am covetous of something better, the possession of which I frequently enjoy within me before I commence to body it forth in intelligible words: and then when my capacities of expression prove inferior to my inner apprehensions, I grieve over the inability which my tongue has betrayed in answering to my heart. For it is my wish that he who hears me should have the same complete understanding of the subject which I myself have; and I perceive that I fail to speak in a manner calculated to effect that, and that this arises mainly from the circumstance that the intellectual apprehension diffuses itself through the mind with something like a rapid flash, whereas the utterance is slow, and occupies time, and is of a vastly different nature, so that, while this latter is moving on, the intellectual apprehension has already withdrawn itself within its secret abode." He says that often in his desire to express himself in exact accordance with his intellectual apprehension at the time, he fails while engaged in the very effort. Accordingly he becomes discouraged and wearied, and the discourse itself becomes even more languid and pointless than it was when it first caused him such a sense of tediousness.<sup>7</sup>

Augustine says further, "*But oftentimes the earnestness of those who are desirous of hearing me shows me that my utterance is not so frigid as it seems to myself to be. From the delight, too, which they exhibit, I gather that they derive some profit from it. And I occupy myself sedulously with the endeavor not to fail in putting before them a service in which I perceive them to take in such good part what is put before them.*" Augustine continues to say that a person is listened to with much greater satisfaction when he himself takes pleasure in his work, because his very words are affected by the joy which he

<sup>7</sup> 3.

shares in pronouncing them. Accordingly it is comparatively easy to lay down rules as to where narration should commence and end, how it should be varied, etc.; but how it shall be done so that one may have pleasure in his work when he catechizes, for on this largely depends his success, that requires the greatest consideration."<sup>8</sup>

In giving some reasons why one's speech seems so weak and inferior to one's thoughts, Augustine says, "because our intelligence is better pleased and more thoroughly arrested by that which we perceive in silence in the mind, and because we have no inclination to have our attention called off from it to a noise of words coming far short of representing it; or from the circumstance that even when discourse is pleasant, *we have more delight in hearing or reading things which have been expressed in a superior manner, and which are set forth without any care or anxiety on our part, than putting together, with a view to the comprehension of others, words suddenly conceived, and leaving it an uncertain issue, on the one hand, whether such terms occur to us as adequately represent the sense and, on the other, whether they be accepted in such a manner as to profit.*"<sup>9</sup>

As Augustine goes on discussing the various remedies to be applied to a weary audience, he says, "*But in a good truth it is a serious demand to make upon us, to continue discoursing on to the set limit when we fail to see our hearers in any degree moved; whether it be that, under the restraints of the awe of religion, he has not the boldness to signify his approval by voice, or by any movement of his body, or that he is kept back by the modesty proper to man, or that he does not understand our sayings, or that he counts them of no value. Since, then, this must be a matter of uncertainty to us, as we cannot discern his mind, it becomes our duty in our discourse to make trial of all things which may be of any avail in stirring him up and drawing him forth as it were from his place of concealment.*"<sup>10</sup>

"It is likewise a frequent occurrence," says Augustine, "that one who at first listened to us with all readiness, becomes exhausted either by the effort of hearing or by standing, and now no longer commends what is said but gapes and yawns, and, though unwillingly, exhibits a disposition to depart. When we

<sup>8</sup> 4.<sup>9</sup> 14.<sup>10</sup> 18.

observe that, it becomes our duty to refresh his mind by saying something seasoned with an honest cheerfulness and adapted to the matter which is being discussed, or something of a very wonderful and amazing order, or even, it may be, something of a painful and mournful nature. Whatever we say thus may be all the better if it affects him himself more immediately, so that the quick sense of self-concern may keep his attention on the alert." However, we should be careful not to offend but rather conciliate, he says. We may even offer our congregation seats, especially if it is small and appears heedless. Or we may say something very striking to bring them away from the cause of their inattention.<sup>11</sup>

Augustine says further, "I wish you to keep in mind the fact that the mental effort is of one kind in the case of the person who dictates, with a future reader in his view, and that it is of quite another kind in the case of a person who speaks with a present hearer to whom to direct his attention. And further, it is to be remembered that, in this latter instance, in particular, the effort is of one kind, when one is admonishing in private, and when there is no other person at hand to pronounce judgment on us; whereas it is of a different order when one is conveying any instruction in public, and when there stand around him an audience of persons holding dissimilar opinions; and again, that in this exercise of teaching, the effort will be of one sort when only a single individual is being instructed, while all the rest listen, like persons judging or attesting things well known to them, and that it will be different when all those who are present wait for what we have to deliver to them; and once more, that, in this same instance, the effort will be one thing when all are seated, as it were, in private conference with a view to engaging in some discussion, and that it will be quite another thing when the people sit silent and intent on giving attention to some single speaker who is to address them from a higher position." He continues that it will likewise make a difference in one's discourse whether one is addressing few or many; learned or unlearned, or both classes combined; city-bred or rustics, or both mingled together; or whether again the audience is composed of all classes of men in

due proportion. All such situations are bound to affect the speaker in different ways, and influence his ways, and accordingly produce different effects on the congregation. "I am a witness to you, as regards my own experience," says Augustine, "*that I find myself variously moved, according as I see before me for the purpose of catechetical instruction, a highly educated man, a poor man, a private individual, a man of honors, a person occupying some position of authority, an individual of this or another nation, of this or another age or sex, one proceeding from this or another sect, from this or another common error,—and ever in accordance with the difference of my feelings does my discourse itself set out, go on, and reach its end.*"<sup>12</sup>

Beginning with section 24, Augustine presents a type sermon, such as he himself would give to catechumens.<sup>13</sup> It is remarkable how this discourse lacks the liveliness and the vividness common to his regular sermons. This deficiency may be due partly to its being merely a sermon for illustration, but chiefly, we feel sure, to its being a carefully written discourse, i. e. written as he was dictating the entire work of the *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, and not delivered without written assistance and recorded at the moment, as we have every reason to believe that his regular sermons were.<sup>14</sup>

We have already had occasion to quote the last sentence of the *Retractations* where according to the correct reading Augustine speaks of his letters as *dictatas* and his sermons as *dictos*.<sup>15</sup> Possidius in his life of Augustine says: "In private and in public, at home and in the church, Augustine taught and preached the word of salvation both by his finished books and by extemporaneous sermons."<sup>16</sup> *Confectus* meaning "composed," "written," "finished," or "elaborate" was in common use

<sup>12</sup> 23.<sup>14</sup> Cf. Chapter VII.<sup>13</sup> Cf. 51, and end of 23.<sup>15</sup> Cf. Introduction.

<sup>16</sup> Et docebat ac praedicabat ille privatim et publice in domo et in ecclesia salutis verbum libris confectis et repentinis sermonibus. Much information on Augustine's manner of preaching is obtained from the *Vita S. Aurelii Augustini* of Possidius, Bishop of Guelma. This is a most trustworthy source, because Possidius was on very intimate terms with Augustine for forty years, and expressly says that he is relating only what he has actually seen and heard.

even in classical times.<sup>17</sup> In this statement from Possidius, *confectis* stands in sharp contrast with *repentinis*, which can scarcely mean anything else than "not prepared before in writing" (lit. "sudden").<sup>18</sup>

Possidius tells also of an incident which gives added testimony as to the manner in which Augustine preached. On returning one day from the church to his group of pupils, Augustine remarked: "Did you take notice that both the beginning and the ending of my sermon in the church today worked out contrary to my usual custom? For I did not explain to its conclusion the subject which I had propounded, but left it in suspense." "I suppose that perhaps the Lord wished some wanderer among the people to be taught and healed by our forgetfulness and error; for in His hands are we and all our utterances. For while I was investigating the margins of the question proposed, by a digression of speech I passed over to something else, and so, without finishing or explaining the question, I ended my discourse by attacking the error of the Manichaeans—about which I had intended to say nothing in my discussion—rather than by speaking about those things which I had intended to explain."<sup>19</sup> Possidius relates further that on the very next day, a merchant, Firmus by name, appeared begging to be taken into the true fold and away from the Manichaeans.

In a letter to his bosom friend Alypius, Bishop of Tagaste,<sup>20</sup> Augustine gives another instance of his speaking extempore, or with but slight previous meditation on the subject. He says, "We must not fail to inform your charity of what was done, that with us you may give thanks to God for the favor received, in behalf of which your prayers were united with ours. Soon after your departure, it was announced that the men were tumultuous, and said they could not suffer that feast to be abolished, from which, by calling it Laetitia, they vainly attempted, as you were informed when present, to remove the idea

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Cicero Att. 6, 7, 2; Cicero Fam. 3, 11, 4; Caesar B. G. 1, 29; Quintilian 10, 1, 19; Nepos Att. 18, 6; Nepos Hann. 13.

<sup>18</sup> The meaning of *repentini* is clearly illustrated in a letter of Sidonius Apollinaris to Pope Faustus. Cf. Chapter II.

<sup>19</sup> 15.

<sup>20</sup> 2, 37 (Augustini Opera).



of drunkenness. By the secret council of Almighty God, it happened very opportunely for us, that on Wednesday that portion of the Gospel was to be treated of in the course of which He says, "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine." I enlarged upon the crime of drunkenness as far as time would permit, and took up the apostle Paul," etc.

In one of his sermons, Augustine shows clearly that he was in the habit of thinking out his sermon beforehand, but not of writing it down. He says, "*ego qui vobiscum loquor, antequam ad vos venirem, cogitavi ante quod vobis dicerem. Quando cogitavi quod vobis dicerem, iam in corde meo verbum erat. Non enim vobis dicerem, nisi ante cogitarem.*"<sup>21</sup>

Augustine, however, often did speak entirely extempore. If we had no definite testimony to that effect, we could hardly doubt his ability to do so, if we considered his ideas on the manner of expressing the truths of Scripture; the emphasis he lays on speaking, not reading, sermons, and on watching the audience for evidence of its proper understanding of the truths expounded, and on noting the various effects of one's words on the hearers with a corresponding adaptation of the process of the sermon. The man who could preach successfully in this way would certainly be able to preach strictly extempore if the occasion demanded.

There are several sermons, however, in which Augustine tells his congregation quite frankly that he has been inspired with the subject of his present sermon while listening to the reading of the Gospel, and must accordingly improvise.<sup>22</sup> These discourses, it must be confessed, do not differ markedly from the average run of Augustine's homilies. Yet in the case of such a constant preacher as Augustine, it is difficult to class any sermon as purely extempore, since he must have been more or less prepared to expound any well-known text of the Scripture.

We may say then that Augustine delivered his sermons without any written assistance, after having first meditated on his text more or less. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the fact that there is not the slightest reason to believe that Augustine ever wrote (or dictated) a sermon, and then read it or

<sup>21</sup> 225, 3.

<sup>22</sup> See Chapter VI.

delivered it from memory. Indeed every statement of Augustine himself excludes the idea.

# VI. AUGUSTINE'S CONSTANT USE OF THE NOTARIUS IN EVERY PHASE OF HIS LITERARY ACTIVITY.

Augustine's sermons were recorded and have been preserved to us through the ecclesiastical shorthand writers. That *notarii* were present in the church when Augustine preached is expressly stated by Possidius. He says, "Even the heretics themselves gathered together and listened with the Catholics most eagerly to these books and treatises which issued and flowed forth by the wonderful grace of God, filled with abundance of reason and the authority of Holy Scripture; each one also who would or could, bringing reporters and taking down what was said."<sup>1</sup> And, "The Donatists, in particular, who lived in Hippo and the neighboring towns, brought his addresses and writings to their bishops."<sup>2</sup>

Augustine, too, in a letter to the consuls Theodosius and Valentinianus, speaks of the *Notarii Ecclesiae*. In this letter he quotes from one of his sermons delivered previously, in which he specially called the attention of his audience to the fact that *notarii* were taking down his words and their exclamations of applause.<sup>3</sup>

This common use of the *notarius* in the churches of other early fathers has already been discussed,<sup>4</sup> but in a letter written jointly with Alypius to Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, Augustine seems to show that it was customary among preachers of the time to leave the shorthand reports of their sermons untranscribed until they saw fit to make use of them. In this letter, Augustine congratulates Aurelius on the excellent sermons which the priests gave in his presence and begs that some of them be sent to him. He says, "Obsecramus te per eum qui tibi ista donavit, et populum, cui servis, hac per te bene-

<sup>1</sup> 7.

<sup>2</sup> 9.

<sup>3</sup> 213. A Notariis Ecclesiae, sicut cernitis, excipiuntur quae dicimus, excipiuntur quae dicitis, et meus sermo et vestrae acclamations in terram non cadunt.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Chapter III.

dictione perfudit, ut iubeas singulos quos volueris sermones eorum conscriptos, et emendatos mitti nobis."<sup>5</sup> The words *conscriptos* and *emendatos* in this connection naturally mean to be written up from the shorthand reports with whatever changes the preacher desired in his more or less extemporaneous and so perhaps careless statements.

Degert (*loc. cit.*) makes a great deal of a passage from Possidius to support his belief that Augustine wrote out most of his sermons before delivery. The words of Possidius are, "Tanta autem ab eodem dictata et edita sunt, tantaque in ecclesia disputata, excepta atque emendata, vel adversus diversos haereticos, vel ex canonicis libris exposita ad aedificationem sanctorum ecclesiae filiorum, ut ea omnia vix quisquam studiosorum perlegere et nosse sufficiat."<sup>6</sup> Possidius however distinguishes clearly here between Augustine's finished works, dictated (*dictata*) and published (*edita*), and his disputations in the churches, taken down (*excepta*) and emended (*emendata*). The sense here regarding Augustine's disputations or sermons is clearly the same as that respecting the sermons which Augustine himself speaks of in the passage quoted just above. The discourses were taken down by *notarii*, transcribed from the shorthand notes, and emended before circulation.

Augustine's entire life was very intimately connected with the shorthand writers. That he made use of *notarii* in the privacy of his study, is attested not only by frequent allusions to them, often by name, in his own writings,<sup>7</sup> but also by the statements of Possidius. The latter says, "But when such things had been arranged and set in order, then, as though freed from consuming and annoying cares, his soul rebounded to the more intimate and lofty thoughts of the mind in order either to ponder on the discovery of divine truth or to dictate some of the things already discovered or else to emend some of the works which had been previously dictated and then transcribed."<sup>8</sup>

The intimate and important position of the *notarius* in the life of Augustine and his friends is shown by the manner in

<sup>5</sup> 41, 2.

<sup>6</sup> 18.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. P. L. (*Opera Augustini*) 2, 26; 2, 488; 2, 490; 3, 55; 9, 807; etc.

<sup>8</sup> 24. Cf. also 18, quoted above.

which they speak of the shorthand writer in their private correspondence. Thus, to cite only a few out of many passages of this sort, Jerome writes to Augustine and laments the lack, in Palestine, of *notarii* that have a good knowledge of Latin.<sup>9</sup> Evodius writes to Augustine in much distress over the loss of a particularly bright *notarius*.<sup>10</sup> In one instance Augustine has just received a letter from a certain Seleuciana, in which he is informed of the very curious theological opinion of one of his acquaintances. In answering this letter, Augustine, unable to believe that the person in question could have entertained such a belief, suggests that the *notarius* has taken down the letter from dictation inaccurately, or has deliberately falsified the note when copying it into longhand. The possibility of his friend's not having a *notarius* does not enter his mind.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore the discussions of Augustine with his associates at Cassiciacum, taken down by the ever-present *notarius*, form the substance of the books "Against the Academics," "On the Order of Providence," and "On the Happy Life."<sup>12</sup>

Not only did Augustine employ the *notarius* for the well-known duties of the scholar's secretary, but he also found him indispensable for reporting his oral debates with heretics. In such cases the *notarii* acted officially just as court stenographers do today. It was indeed from these shorthand records that Augustine was later able to make the compendium of his various public debates with the Donatists, which now exists under the name, "*Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis*."<sup>13</sup>

Possidius, in recounting the various public debates in which

<sup>9</sup> P. L. 33, 753. *Grandem Latini sermonis in ista provincia notariorum patimur penuriam; et idcirco praeceptis tuis parere non possumus, maxime in editione Septuaginta, quae asteriscis verubusque distincta est.*

<sup>10</sup> P. L. 33, 694. *Erat strenuus in notis, et in scribendo bene laboriosus, studiosus quoque esse coeperat lectionis, ut ipse meam tarditatem causa legendi nocturnis horis exhortaretur. Coeperam eum non quasi puerum et notarium habere, sed amicum quemdam satis necessarium et suavem.*

<sup>11</sup> P. L. 33, 1085. *Si enim notarius non mendose excepit aut scripsit, nescio quale cor habeat qui cum Apostolos baptizatos dicat, Petrum baptizatum negat.*

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *De Ordine*, 1, 5.

<sup>13</sup> P. L. 43.

his venerated teacher took part, rarely fails to mention either the *notarius* or his art. Thus a certain *domus regiae procurator* at Carthage discovered a clandestine gathering of Manichaeans, whom he immediately took to a board of bishops and had examined *ad tabulas*.<sup>14</sup> Among these bishops was Augustine himself.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, regarding Augustine's controversies with the Manichaeans Fortunatus (392) and Felix (404), Possidius says, "Unde conducto die et loco convenerunt in unum, concurrentibus quam plurimis studiosis turbisque curiosis, et apertis notarii tabulis disputatio coepta primo, et secundo finita est die."<sup>16</sup> And also, "Cum quodam etiam Felice de numero eorum quos electos dicunt Manichaei, publice in Hipponensi ecclesia notariis excipientibus disputavit populo astante."<sup>17</sup>

Pascentius, the Arian, once engaged Augustine in a public debate, but contrary to the usual custom, positively forbade the use of the tablets and stylus.<sup>18</sup> Later (427 or 428) Augustine overcame the Arian bishop Maximinus in public debate. From the shorthand accounts of this meeting Augustine was afterwards obliged to publish a recapitulation, since Maximinus had succeeded in spreading incorrect reports about the encounter.<sup>19</sup>

The public debates with the Donatists, however, furnish us with the most interesting incidents regarding this use of *notarii*. The Donatist bishop Emeritus was refuted in public debate, and indeed remained silent so long in the midst of his speech that finally the *notarius* himself urged him to continue.<sup>20</sup> Augustine himself tells us of a striking incident which occurred at his public debate with the Donatist bishop Fortunatus. The regular *notarii*, for some unknown reason, refused to serve at the contest, regardless of any sort of inducement. Volunteers were summoned from the audience. These, although willing

<sup>14</sup> *Ad tabulas; notariis excipientibus et in tabulas inferentibus interrogata et responsa.* Note in Huerta's edition, page 36.

<sup>15</sup> 16.

<sup>16</sup> 6.

<sup>17</sup> 16.

<sup>18</sup> Possidius, 17. Sed idem haereticus tabulas atque stilum, quod magister noster et ante congressum, et in congressu instantissime fieri volebat, ne adessent omni modo recusat.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Possidius, 17.

<sup>20</sup> Possidius, 16. Et alio loco, dum a notario, ut responderet, admoneretur et reticeret, eius cunctis manifestata diffidentia, Ecclesiae Dei augmenta ac firmamenta provenerunt.



enough, were utterly unable to keep up with the rapid speech of the contestants and were finally obliged to stop writing.<sup>21</sup> Shorthand experts were employed in behalf of the state as well as the church at the famous conference of Catholic and Donatist bishops at Carthage in 411. Augustine says a great deal in this connection in his public letter summoning all Donatists to the true Church. That part of the letter in which we are interested reads: "Both your bishops and we arrived in Carthage, and, although they were before unwilling and said it was not in accordance with their dignity, we all met. Seven were selected from our number and seven from theirs who were to be representatives in the debate. Then seven more were chosen from each party, with whom the former seven were to take counsel when there was need. Then four were selected from each side to have charge of writing up the proceedings, lest some falsehood be inserted by somebody. Four stenographers also were given by each party to alternate two at a time in doing the work of the judge's stenographers, lest some one of us pretend that something was said which was not taken down. To this great care another caution was added, that both they and we should, just as the judge himself, subscribe to our words, lest some one say afterwards that there had been some meddling, etc., etc."<sup>22</sup>

Thus did Augustine use the *notarius* in his various works, his sermons, letters, debates, and finished productions, and it is hard to believe that the bishop of Hippo himself, one of the busiest of men both in literary and administrative ways, ever performed the mechanical task of mere writing in connection with his literary productions except in the most incidental way. We know that his sermons were taken down by *notarii* as he delivered them. Are we to believe that he performed the mechanical task of copying the shorthand?

(To be continued.)

ROY J. DEFERRARI.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.

<sup>21</sup> Ep. 44.

<sup>22</sup> Ep. 141, 2. Cf. also *Excerpta ad Donatistarum historiam pertinentia*. P. L. 43, 816, 820.

## II.—WHEN IS GENERIC MH PARTICULAR?

The articular participle when negated by μή is *indefinite, generic*, refers to a class. ὁ μὴ βουλόμενος is “*anyone* that does not wish”; it includes *everyone* that belongs in that class. Why, then, does Sophocles say ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ μολών, ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπαυσά νιν *O. T.* 397? The relative pronoun with μή is also usually *generic, indefinite*, yet Herodotus writes ταῦτα λέγοντος Θεμιστοκλέος αὐτῷ ὁ Κορίνθιος Ἀδείμαντος ἐπεφέρετο, σιγᾷ τε κελύων τῷ μὴ ἔστι πατρίς 8.61. It is the custom to call such relative clauses *characterizing, qualitative*: see Kühner-Gerth II. 185, Stahl *S. G. V.* 769, Smyth § 1608. Kühner-Gerth II. 202 is not so certain about the ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς: “*auffälliger S. Ant.* 771 οὐ τὴν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν (wer nicht teilnahm, statt: sie, die nicht teilnahm). *O. R.* 397 . . . ich, ein ahnungsloser Mann,” if auffälliger applies to both examples. Stahl, p. 776, says “Das durch den Artikel substantivierte Partizipium gestattet beide Negationen; doch erscheint μὴ mehr in qualitativem Sinne,” and cautiously avoids any reference to cases like ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους. And Smyth, § 1608, after stating that “μὴ is often used to mark *character*,” adds “in such cases ὁ μὴ may refer to a definite person or thing,” but says nothing of ὁ μὴ (εἰδὼς) when used of a definite person (*cf.* § 1623). I suppose the greater doubt about ὁ μὴ arises from the fact that we find it easy to say *a man who* for ὁ μὴ, whereas we should translate *Socrates although he was wise* by ὁ ὦν σοφός not ὁ ὦν σοφός, feeling that the latter means *that particular person whom you know to be wise*, as distinguished from others. What right, indeed, have we to take ἐγὼ ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς as “*I, though a man who did not know?*” In τὴν μὴ θιγοῦσαν *Antig.* 771 there is a case where our device of *a person who* does us no good, for, Ismene’s name not being mentioned, the only possible translation is “*the one who did not touch.*” It should be added that we are too apt to deceive ourselves with our English *a man who*, which is not always *indefinite*. It is not indefinite in “*I am hurrying to save a man who is eager to die,*” for *I* have a definite person in mind, but I do not say *the man who* because *you*, to whom I am speaking, have not heard of the case.

No doubt all of us who teach have often used the words *generic*, *indefinite* to explain a μή, without pausing to consider whether they really applied to the case in question. Our college texts are full of examples. Take this note in Morgan's *Lysias* on ἐνθυμείσθαι δὲ χρὴ ποτέροις χρὴ πιστεῖν μᾶλλον, οἷς πολλοὶ μεμαρτυρήκασιν ἢ ᾧ μηδεὶς τετόλμηκε 7.38: "by the use of the plur. οἷς, the speaker treats himself as one of a class, and then draws particular attention to his opponent by the sing. ᾧ." Then he adds "μηδεὶς: indef.; see on § 11," and in § 11 there is the usual reference to indefinite relative clauses, "G. 1426, 1428" etc. But if a relative clause calls *particular* attention to an *individual*, how can it be *indefinite*? In A. J. P. XXXIII. 443 Goodell says: "And one clear case of the generalizing relative clause in the indicative occurs (in Homer): ἐστὶ δὲ πάντες | μάρτυροι, οὓς μὴ κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτου φέρουσαι B 302. No will is conceivable here, no passionate protest, nothing to differentiate this from the Attic idiom. οὐ might just as easily have been used, even to the meter, only with different tone, lacking the generalization." I suppose that the late Professor Goodell knew exactly what he meant when he called this relative clause generalizing; but, the antecedent of οὓς being *you*, the subject of ἐστὶ, I confess to a feeling of protest. Just what do we mean when we call a phrase *generalizing* that refers to a particular individual? Presumably, that it puts that individual into a class. But all adjectives and many relative clauses do that without making μή possible. In "Socrates, though not a rich man, has bought this place," Socrates is *classified* with the not-rich, but no one would think of translating by ὅς μή, or ὅν μή, while ὁ μὴ ὢν πλούσιος would be even more inconceivable, if there are degrees in the inconceivable. *Qualifying* and *characterizing* may be applied to most relative clauses. Does the writer, then, use μή where he wishes to emphasize character, that is, practically when he pleases? Few would admit that in the classical period the writer had such liberty. οὐ is necessary in a relative clause when the writer makes an assertion, conveys information. Is it possible, then, to lay down a rule that ὅς μή is characterizing, but is used only when the fact contained in the relative clause is already well known and does not need to be asserted? In the examples of ὅς μή and ὁ μὴ that refer to definite individuals I shall have occasion to point out that the

*fact* contained in the clause or phrase has almost always been stated in what precedes, usually in the immediate context; occasionally it is so self-evident that it does not need statement, as in B 302, where Agamemnon would hardly be expected to *inform* his audience that they are not dead. Yet, while this previous knowledge is an important element in all the examples of *ὅς μή* and *ὁ μή* with which I am acquainted, it is not enough, in itself, to explain the *μή*. Let us compare with *ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους* the following from Soph. *Trach.* 773 *ἐνταῦθα δὲ 'βόησε τὸν δυσδαίμονα Λίχαν, τὸν οὐδὲν αἴτιον τοῦ σοῦ κακοῦ*. Why is *οὐ* used here? Because Lichas is a definite person? But so is Oedipus. Is *τὸν οὐδὲν αἴτιον* less characterizing than *ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς*? By no means; and it is quite possible to say "though a man who was not guilty." Does, then, *τὸν οὐδὲν αἴτιον* convey information? Hardly. No one knew better than Deianeira, to whom Hyllus is speaking, that Lichas was in no way to blame.

The articular participle with *μή* is common in connection with partitive genitives, as *'Αθηναίων οἱ μή βουλόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις μάχεσθαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν κακῶς πείσονται* Lys. 14. 15. Here the Athenians are divided into two classes, those who are not willing to fight, and those who are willing; and the two classes together make up the whole body. Normally, at least, *οἱ μή βουλόμενοι* means *all* that are in the class, as it does in Lys. 14. 15. No doubt there are examples where the context suggests that, while the action affects the class, every individual in the class need not be thought of. I should be inclined to so interpret *μάλιστα δ' ἐσυκοφάντησε τῶν ὑπευθύνων τοὺς μηδὲν ἡδικοκίας* Aeschin. 1. 107. We call *οἱ μή βουλόμενοι* *indefinite*, and it may be so, in the sense that the speaker need not know all who are in the class. But it is quite possible that particular persons should be in mind. Thus in *ὁ Δαρεῖος ταύτης ἐχόμενος τῆς προφάσιος καταστρέφεισθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοὺς μή δόντας αὐτῷ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ* Hdt. 6. 94 there is no suggestion that Darius did not know exactly who had not submitted; yet *μή* is right because the whole body is divided into two classes. Plato speaks of *τὰ δίκαια* and *τὰ μή δίκαια* knowing what he would put in the latter class. His ideas are quite *definite* on that subject. When a body, then, is divided into two classes that are *opposites*, *οἱ (ὄντες)* and *οἱ μή (ὄντες)* are the correct terms, whether or not the exact individuals are known. Further, the body or group thus divided may be of

any size. It may be all mankind; it may be the Athenians (Lys. 14. 15); it may be a small body of Athenian officials (Aeschin. 1. 107). There may be ten people in the group; and if nine of these are just and one unjust, there seems to be no reason why we should not, in referring to that one, use the phrase τῶν δέκα ὁ μὴ δίκαιος, even if it is known which of the ten is the unjust one. From this point of view all examples with which I am acquainted can be satisfactorily explained. The rule, then, is: ὁ μὴ with a participle (or adjective) may apply to a definite individual (proper name or personal pronoun) when that individual is the only one of a group belonging to a certain class, the others being of the opposite class, and when it is well-known that he is of that class. I shall take a few of the best known examples for full discussion. In the other cases<sup>1</sup> I shall briefly cite the proof that the ὁ μὴ individual is the only one of his kind in a group.

Soph. Antig. 771:

ἄμφω γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ κατακτεῖναι νοεῖς;  
—οὐ τήν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν.

There are two (ἄμφω) people in the group. Antigone is ἡ θιγοῦσα, Ismene ἡ μὴ θιγοῦσα. The question is asked by the Chorus and Creon answers. In their presence Antigone has stated (546) that Ismene had nothing to do with the burial, using this very verb—μὴ μοι θάψῃς σὺ κοινά, μηδ' ἂ μὴ 'θιγες ποιούσων. This example is of special interest because it is almost the only one in which the phrase is not attached to a proper name or personal pronoun. Yet one has not the slightest doubt who is meant, and no one would attempt to translate otherwise than by "not the one that did not touch." Jebb makes no remark on the μὴ. Doubtless, if the phrase had followed Ismene's name, we should have had his usual, and to me meaningless, paraphrase "who is as if she had not touched." D'Ooge says the μὴ is used "as if there might still be some doubt about her having put her hand to the deed"; to Humphreys "the μὴ implies a logical condition, a concession of her innocence."

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted for many of the examples used throughout this paper to Gallaway, *On the Use of Μή with the Participle in Classical Greek*, J. H. U. diss., Baltimore, Md., 1897.



Eur. I. A. 382:

λέκτρα χρήστ' ἐρῆς λαβεῖν;  
οὐκ ἔχοιμ' ἄν σοι παρασχεῖν · ὦν γὰρ ἐκτίσσω, κακῶς  
ἦρχες. εἴτ' ἐγὼ δίκην δῶ σῶν κακῶν, ὃ μὴ σφαλεῖς;

Agamemnon is speaking to Menelaus. They are the only people involved. Note the emphatic ἐγὼ and σῶν. Agamemnon charges that Menelaus himself is to blame for the loss of Helen. κακῶς ἦρχες, he says, and adds σῶν κακῶν. Of the two, then, he himself must be the one who has not erred. It was no fault of his that Helen had been carried off. Many others had nothing to do with it, but they are not here in mind. "Am I to be punished for your fault, I, the guiltless, for you, the guilty?"

Dem. 19. 31: ἡ βουλὴ δὲ ἢ μὴ κωλυθεῖσ' ἀκούσαι τᾶληθῇ παρ' ἐμοῦ. The contrast is between the βουλή and the ἐκκλησία. The assembly was the one that was prevented from listening to Demosthenes, the senate was the one that was not prevented. The following extracts make the situation clear. § 18. παρελθὼν δ' ἐγὼ πάντα τᾶληθῇ πρὸς τὴν βουλήν ἀπήγγεila . . . καὶ ἔπεισα ταῦτα τὴν βουλήν. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἦκεν ἡ ἐκκλησία . . . παρελθὼν Αἰσχίνης . . . εἶπε. . . . § 23. κατέβη μάλα σεμνῶς. ἀναστὰς δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτά τ' οὐκ ἔφην εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπειρώμην τι λέγειν τούτων ὧν εἰς τὴν βουλήν ἀπήγγεila καὶ παραστὰς ὃ μὲν ἔθεν, ὃ δ' ἔθεν, . . . ἐβόων . . . ὑμεῖς δ' ἐγελᾶτε, καὶ οὐτ' ἀκούειν ἠθέλετε.

Dem. 19. 221: εἰ γὰρ αὐ ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ, σκοπεῖτ' εἰ ἐφ' οἷς ὃ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἀδικῶν ἐφοβούμην ἐγὼ μὴ διὰ τούτους ἀπόλωμαι, τί τούτους προσήκει παθεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡδικηκότας; And, again, in § 224, δέδοικα . . . μὴ τότε μὲν συνεπισπάσθησθέ με τὸν μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἀδικοῦντα, νῦν δ' ἀναπεπτωκότες ἦτε. There were ten ambassadors and Demosthenes, according to his own story, was "the only one who had not done anything at all that was wrong." In § 229 Philocrates, Aeschines, and Phrynon are mentioned as the real traitors, but nowhere in the speech is there a suggestion that anyone but Demosthenes himself had acted as duty to his country required. And there is one passage that pretty plainly intimates that all the others had accepted something from Philip — ἐκάστῳ προσπέμπων ἰδίᾳ καὶ πολὺ γε διδοὺς χρυσίον. ὥς δ' ἀπετύγχανεν ὁτουδήποτε, οὐ γὰρ ἐμέ γ' εἰπεῖν ἐμavτὸν δεῖ (§ 167). Aeschines himself (2. 97) says none of the other ambassadors would have anything to do with Demosthenes, in so far corroborating the latter's division of the embassy into two groups, himself and the

rest. It should also be observed that, while *μηδ' ὅτιοι' ἀδικῶν* emphasizes Demosthenes' innocence, it leaves it open to us to infer that some of the others may have done very little that was wrong.

Soph. *O. T.* 390:

ἐπεὶ, φέρ' εἰπέ, ποῦ σὺ μάντις εἰ σαφής;  
 πῶς οὐχ, ὅθ' ἡ ῥαψῶδὸς ἐνθάδ' ἦν κύων,  
 ἧῦδας τι τοῖσδ' ἀστοῖσιν ἐκλυτήριον;  
 καίτοι τό γ' αἰνιγμ' οὐχὶ τοῦπιόντος ἦν  
 ἀνδρὸς διειπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντείας ἔδει.  
 ἦν οὐτ' ἀπ' οἰωνῶν σὺ προῦφάνης ἔχων  
 οὐτ' ἐκ θεῶν του γνωτόν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μολών,  
 ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπαυσά νιν,  
 γνώμη κυρήσας οὐδ' ἀπ' οἰωνῶν μαθών.

I have kept this, probably the best known, example until now, because in the preceding passages the *groups*, Antigone and Ismene, Agamemnon and Menelaus, the Senate and the Assembly, and the ten ambassadors are such evident groups that it is impossible to avoid seeing them. I believe also that Oedipus calls himself ὁ μὴδὲν εἰδὼς only in contrast with Teiresias. A careful reading of the whole context will lead to that conclusion, but the other examples may help to overcome objections. Teiresias is a professional *knower* (σὺ μάντις; μαντείας ἔδει); Oedipus was 'untaught of birds.' He had, in fact, guessed the riddle without help from anyone—ὅς γ' ἐξέλυσε σκληρὰς ἀοιδοῦ δασμόν . . . καὶ ταῦθ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἐξειδὼς πλέον οὐδ' ἐκδιδαχθείς ll. 35 ff.

Dem. 37. 8, 28, 57: ἐμοῦ τοῦ μὴδ' ἐπιδημοῦντος. Nicobulus (the speaker), Pantaenetus, and Euergus are alone involved (see § 4). Nicobulus was *the only one* out of town: ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκπλέον εἰς τὸν Πόντον εὐθὺς ψόχῳ, οὗτος (Pantaenetus) δ' ἐνθάδ' ἦν καὶ Εὐεργος (§ 6).—Dem. 45. 38 ὑμᾶς . . . τοὺς μὴδαμῇ μὴδαμῶς τοῦ πράγματος ἐγγύς. By ὑμᾶς is meant Stephanus and his associates (§ 8). With them are contrasted (§ 38) ἐκείνους, who are Nicocles and Pasicles, guardian and ward (§ 37). The argument is that, if these two had not testified to the contents of the διαθήκαι, Stephanus and his associates had no right to do so, for they, in comparison with the former, knew nothing. Compare οὗτοι (Stephanus *et al.*) δ' οὐτ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς παρήσαν ἔχουεν ἂν εἰπεῖν, οὐτ' ἀνοιχθέν εἶδον πρὸς τῷ διαι-

τητῇ τὸ γραμματεῖον (§ 23).—Antiph. 5. 65: ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἰργασμένῳ τοσοῦτον τὸ μακρότατον τῆς ἀποκρίσεώς ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰργασμαι · τῷ δὲ ποιήσαντι ῥαδία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις. The man that committed the murder is contrasted with “me *the one* (of the two) that did not do it.” The accused, of course, has frequently asserted his innocence. Compare ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς αἰτιὸς εἰμι τοῦ πράγματος . . . ἀποδίδεσθαι (§ 64).—Antiph. 2. a. 3: τῆς θ’ ὑμετέρας ἀμαρτίας ἡ ποινὴ εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς μὴ δικαίως διώκοντας ἀναχωρεῖ. ὑμετέρας refers to the judges, the representatives of the πόλις. “The whole state is polluted while the guilty man goes unpunished; but, of course, we, the prosecutors, are not pursuing the wrong man, for, if we do, the penalty for *your* fault (in leaving the guilty unpunished) comes upon us, *the particular ones* (in the state) that do not prosecute justly.”—Isaeus 1. 11: ἡμᾶς . . . τοὺς μηδὲν αὐτὸν (Cleonymus) ἡδικηκότας. The claimants (ἡμᾶς) are contrasted with Deinias, the enemy (§§ 9, 10) of Cleonymus, the testator.—Isaeus 3. 63: Ξενοκλέα, τὸν μηδαμόθεν μηδὲν γένει προσήκοντα Πύρρῳ. Xenocles is the husband of Phile, who claims to be a legitimate daughter of Pyrrhus, whose estate is in question. The speaker argues that, if Phile were legitimate, there were several relatives of Pyrrhus who would have claimed the heiress, and would not have yielded her to Xenocles, “*the only one* (of those involved) that was not in anyway related to Pyrrhus.” In this case the fact that Xenocles was not related has not been definitely stated before, though it might, perhaps, be inferred from his taking the girl with a very small dowry, ὡς ἐξ ἐταίρας οὔσαν (§ 51).—Isaeus 4. 14. The judges (ὑμᾶς) are contrasted with the legal witnesses of a will. If it is possible to deceive the latter as to the contents, how much more the judges, who in the nature of the case know nothing of the matter, τοὺς μηδὲν τοῦ πράγματος εἰδότας. —Aristoph. *Wasps* 1048: τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔσθ’ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τοῖς μὴ γνοῦσιν παραχρῆμα, ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς οὐδὲν χείρων παρὰ τοῖσι σοφοῖς νενόμισται. The poet divides the audience into two classes, οἱ σοφοί, who vote for him and οἱ μὴ γνόντες, who vote for his competitor. In prose it would be more natural to use the partitive genitive ὑμῶν; but, as the *Clouds* had not got the prize the year before (ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ γνῶναι, l. 1045), he addresses the majority of the audience as τοῖς μὴ γνοῦσιν.—Xen. *Hell.*, 6. 1. 11. The Thessalians and Athenians are in contrast. The former have abundance of grain,

even for export. The Athenians are τοὺς μὴδ' αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν ἔχοντας, ἂν μὴ πρίωνται, a fact too well known to need statement.—Xen. *Symp.* 2. 4: οὐκοῦν νέοις μὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα · ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς μηκέτι γυμναζομένους τίνας ὄζειν δεήσει; The ὁσμή of the *young* is ἐλαίου τοῦ ἐν γυμνασίοις (§ 3). Lycon, the father of Autolycus, asks what is the fitting ὁσμή of the *old*, τοὺς μηκέτι γυμναζομένους.—Eur. *Helen* 1289: τὸν παρόντα μὲν στέργειν πόσιν χρή, τὸν δὲ μηκέτ' ὄντ' εἶναι. Menelaus, the speaker, is the husband *that no longer lives* (ll. 1196, 1286), Theoclymenus is τὸν παρόντα πόσιν. The words, of course, are spoken to Helen and Theoclymenus with the usual dramatic irony. As in *Antigone* 771, the proper name or personal pronoun is lacking here; but it is plain that Menelaus is meant, and the μηκέτι can not be explained as in the ordinary generic use.—Thuc. 6. 80. 5: σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ αἰρείσθε ἥδη ἢ τὴν αὐτίκα ἀκινδύνως δουλείαν ἢ κἂν περιγενομένοι μεθ' ἡμῶν τούσδε τε μὴ αἰσχροῦς δεσπότης λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχθραν μὴ ἂν βραχείαν γενομένην διαφυγεῖν. The example is of a somewhat different kind, but τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχθραν is *definite*, and, as ἂν . . . γενομένην is equivalent to ἂν with the optative, that is an additional reason for οὐ rather than μή. In contrast with the *enmity of the Syracusans* (ἡμᾶς) the context suggests, without actually expressing, the *enmity of the Athenians*. The μὴ βραχείαν seems also to be opposed to αὐτίκα ἀκινδύνως, for, if the Athenians are victorious, the Camarinaeans will have (in their slavery) only a momentary freedom from danger, for the enmity of the Syracusans will be lasting. The explanation is not quite convincing, but it is at least better than calling μὴ generic without attaching any meaning to the term. The ὁ . . . μηδὲν ἂν ὁμόσας in Dem. 54. 40 is clearly generic, though the speaker has himself in mind, as the following ἐγὼ τοίνυν ὁ δικαιότερόν σου πιστευθεὶς ἂν shows. The case is put generally before the particular example of the type is introduced.—Soph. *Ajax* 1229: ἢ που τραφεῖς ἂν μητρὸς εὐγενοῦς ἀπο ὑψίλ' ἐφώνεις κάπ' ἄκρων ὠδοιπόρους, ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἂν τοῦ μηδὲν ἀντίστης ὑπερ; *Electra* 1163: ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας . . . τοιγὰρ σὺν δέξαι μ' ἐς τὸ σὸν τόδε στέγος, τὴν μηδὲν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν, ὥς σὺν σοὶ κάτω ναίω τὸ λοιπόν. In these two examples, though the participle is lacking, the reason for the μὴ should be the same as in the others. Sophocles is fond of these μηδέν, οὐδέν effects, and his meaning is by no means always clear. A rigid application of our rule gives a fairly satisfactory result.

In the *Ajax* passage Teucer is addressed and the οὐδὲν ὢν means that he is not μητρὸς εὐγενοῦς ἄπο. τοῦ μηδέν is Ajax and, if he is called this in contrast to Teucer, being *the one* of the group of two that is μηδέν, it is because he is *dead*. The word-play gets its point from the different meanings that the context gives the negatives. This, I think, is better than Jebb's "being naught . . . for him who is *as* naught." I do not find convincing the assertion that "the only difference between the two expressions is that the phrase with μηδέν is, in effect, somewhat more emphatic, and (here) more bitter, since it implies a mental act of comparison, with the result of deciding that this particular person is *no more than* a nonentity." In the *Electra* passage the negative in εἰς τὸ μηδέν is *generic* and the meaning of the phrase is fixed by ὡς σὺν σοὶ κάτω ναίω; but when Electra calls herself τὴν μηδέν, it must be in a sense that is opposed to what Orestes is, and, therefore does not mean τὴν θανοῦσαν (Jebb) in spite of τέθνηκ' ἐγὼ σοί (1152). Electra means that she, in comparison with Orestes, is *worthless*.

Since the relative clause and the articular participle are not identical in meaning there is no necessity that they should follow exactly the same lines of development. However, it would be difficult to make a distinction in meaning between a relative clause and an articular participle that refer to a proper name or personal pronoun, and we shall find that the rule given above for the articular participle with μή generally holds good for the relative clause with μή, though in some cases the interpretation given is not the only possible one, but rather one that is quite equal in probability to another. The *dependence* of the relative clause should be observed. A relative clause with οὐ after a definite antecedent may be quite unessential, but in these cases the point of the principal clause rests upon the relative.

Hdt. 8. 61 : ταῦτα λέγοντος Θεμιστοκλέος αὐτὶς ὁ Κορίνθιος Ἀδεϊμαντος ἐπεφέρετο, σιγᾶν τε κελεύων τῷ μὴ ἔστι πατρίς. The occasion is a council of the Greek στρατηγοί (8. 58) before the battle of Salamis. It is a fair assumption (see Macan on 8. 49) that there was not more than one στρατηγός from each state represented by a naval contingent; probably, indeed, the smaller contingents were not separately represented. Eurybiades is the στρατηγός of the Spartans and the commander-in-chief (8. 2), Themistocles is the στρατηγός of the Athenians (8. 4), Adei-



mantus of the Corinthians (8. 5). Athens was now completely in the hands of the enemy (8. 53), but the only other state which could possibly have a στρατηγός of its own and which the Persians might by this time have occupied is Eretria with a contingent of seven ships (8. 46)—the twenty from Chalcis were furnished by Athens (8. 1), and were, no doubt, under Themistocles. Herodotus tells us (8. 23) that the Persians had overrun part of northern Euboea, but in 8. 66 he represents the fleet as passing directly on to Athens without a stop. It is, then, probable that if Adeimantus said "Be silent, you who have no country," the description could be meant to apply to Themistocles alone.

Hdt. 7. 125 : οἱ λέοντες . . . ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς ἄπτοντο οὔτε ὑποζυγίου οὔτε ἀνθρώπου, οἱ δὲ τὰς καμήλους ἐκεραίῳζον μούνας. θωμάζω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον ὃ τι κοτὲ ἦν τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἀναγκάζον ἀπεχομένους τοὺς λέοντας τῇσι καμήλοισι ἐπιτίθεσθαι, τὸ μῆτε πρότερον ὀπώπεσαν θηρίον μὴ' ἐπεπειράτο αὐτοῦ. In the army of Xerxes of man and beast the lions attacked the camels only; and, according to the preceding description, the camel is the only non-European animal in the army, *the only one*, then, that the lions had not seen before.

Homer, B. 302:

ἴστέ δὲ πάντες

μάρτυροι, οὓς μὴ κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτῳ φέρουσαι.

Agamemnon is addressing the Assembly of the Greek army at Troy. At Aulis the army had been witnesses of the portent to which he refers. Now "you *the ones* (of that group) that death has not taken are witnesses." There is no difference between this Homeric example and the Attic usage. It is peculiar that in the only certain (ε 489 with *πάρα* is doubtful) case of *μή* in a relative clause with the indicative in Homer, the antecedent should be a definite personal pronoun. Whether *οὐ* might have been used by Homer here, as Goodell states, I do not know. It is for those who think so to produce another example like this. It might be remarked in this connection that in all five examples given by Monroe (§ 359) of Homeric *οὐ* for Attic *μή* the proper negative in Attic would be *οὐ*, for the simple reason that the *class* is already defined by the antecedent and the relative refers to the *whole* of the antecedent. Of course most of these sentences are Homeric types of which it

would not be easy to find counterparts in Attic, but B 143 might be compared with Thuc. 3. 81 ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπέισθησαν.

Soph. *El.* 909: τῷ γὰρ προσήκει πλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ τόδε; καὶ γὰρ μὲν οὐκ ἔδρασα, τοῦτ' ἐπίσταμαι, οὐδ' αὖ σύ· πῶς γάρ; ἢ γε μηδὲ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔξεστ' ἀκλαύστῳ τῇσδ' ἀποστήναι στέγῃς. Only Chrysothemis and Electra (πλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ) are in question, and of the two the latter is *the one* who can not leave the house (see l. 518).

—*Antig.* 694. Antigone is *the only one* who had refused to leave the body of Polynices unburied.—*O. C.* 1678. The manner of Oedipus' death is unique.—Thuc. 4. 126. 2: ὑμῖν προσήκει . . . μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἐτέρων οἳ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἦκετε. Brasidas is addressing his Peloponnesian troops before a battle; the πολιτειῶν τοιούτων are democracies.

As oligarchs accustomed to rule τὸ πλῆθος they need not fear mere numbers. They are the only oligarchs involved, and they know the fact themselves.—Dem. 33. 30: ὅποτε δ' αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνθῆκαι ἠφανίσθησαν, καθ' ὧς ἐμέ φησι γενέσθαι ἐγγυητήν, ἑτέραί δὲ μὴ ἐγράφησαν, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐμοὶ δικάζοιτο, καθ' οὗ μὴ ἔχει παρασχέσθαι συνθήκας; If the συνθήκαι according to which Apatourius claimed that the speaker was ἐγγυητής had disappeared and no new one had been drawn up, the fact stated in the relative clause is self-evident. In § 22 the speaker asserts that Archipus, not he, had been the surety. He, then, is *the one* etc.—

Dem. 33. 34: ἐμοῦ . . . ᾧ τὸ παράπαν πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τουτονὶ μηδὲν συμβόλαιον ἔστιν. For the fact see § 13 μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔτε μείζον οὔτ' ἔλαττον πρὸς αὐτὸν συμβόλαιον γέγονεν. The argument is that if Parmeno had been successful in a suit brought by Apatourius, how much more should he, *the one* etc.—Dem. 19. 313: οὓς μηδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν μηδεὶς ἂν . . . τῶν ἐπαίνων ἀποστερήσειε. The antecedent of οὓς is ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι. In § 312 it is claimed that even the barbarians would admit that the Athenians had saved Greece at Marathon and Salamis; and the Athenians knew well that they were *the only ones* of whom such praises could be uttered.—Dem. 21. 202. Of good news (τι τῶν δεόντων) and bad news (φλαυρόν τι) the latter is *that which* no one else would wish.—Dem. 4. 31: τοῖς πνεύμασιν καὶ ταῖς ὥραις τοῦ ἔτους τὰ πολλὰ προλαμβάνων διαπράττεται Φίλιππος, καὶ φυλάξας τοὺς ἐτησίας ἢ τὸν χειμῶν' ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἥνίκ' ἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ δυναίμεθ' ἐκείσ' ἀφικέσθαι. The antecedent of ἥνικα, τοὺς ἐτησίας and τὸν χειμῶνα, is as definite as a personal pronoun. The meaning is

that *always* at those *periods* it is impossible for the Athenians to arrive quickly. The idea in the relative clause is subordinate to φυλάξας; it is part of Philip's thought. The antecedent being definite Demosthenes might have used οὐκ ἄν with the optative, but in that case the statement would have been his, and he would have been making a quite unnecessary assertion of a well-known fact. This is not "a hypothetical or indefinite relative sentence" (Tarbell) for the meaning is not "whenever we can not get there he makes an attempt," and the ἄν would be impossible. The note in the Westermann-Rosenberg edition, "als des Philippos Meinung zu fassen, wie μή und der Optativ lehren," is right for the μή and wrong for the optative, since the potential optative after a definite antecedent would have been quite admissible as a thought of the speaker. Stahl, *S. G. V.* 449, is wrong in classing the clause as 'synthetic': his idea on p. 770 is better. It need hardly be added that winter and the period of contrary winds was *the only time* at which the Athenians could not quickly get there.—Plato, *Ion* 534 D. If poets are not themselves responsible for the beautiful things they say, God must have put them into their mouths. God has taken away their νοῦς, so that the poets are *the ones* of the two classes, God and the poets, that have no νοῦς.—*Lys.* 215 B. The antecedent is the definite class, οἱ ἀγαθοί, and according to the preceding argument the Good alone are ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς.—*Laws* 838 E: τοῦ μὲν ἄρρενος ἀπεχομένους μὴ κτείνοντάς τε ἐκ προνοίας τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, μηδ' εἰς πέτρας τε καὶ λίθους σπείροντας, οὗ μήποτε φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ριζωθὲν λήφεται γόνιμον, ἀπεχομένους δὲ ἀρούρας θηλείας πάσης, ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούλοιο (v. l. βούλοιτο) ἄν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρέν. Male and female are contrasted. The first relative clause refers to the male and it is self-evident that this class is *the one* in which the seed will not grow. In the second relative clause our text is evidently corrupt. An optative with ἄν would mean that the relative referred to the *whole* female class, whereas the meaning is *keeping away from those in whom they do not wish the seed to grow*. The preference in our texts for βούλοιο over βούλοιτο is due to the σοί, but after ἀπεχομένους the σοί is out of place. ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούληται ἄν τις φύεσθαι would give the required meaning.

In the following passages *the only one*, if not the necessary, is at least a plausible meaning. *Soph. O. T.* 1335. It is evi-

dent to all that for Oedipus "there was nothing sweet to look upon," and it is natural for him to think himself alone in that respect.—*Philoct.* 715. The Chorus is referring, from l. 700 on, to the description that Philoctetes gave of his privations in ll. 287 ff. They assume, with reason, that he is the only man that has not tasted wine in ten years.—*Philoct.* 255. Neoptolemus has just told Philoctetes that he had never heard of him, and the latter assumes that he is especially *πικρὸς θεοῖς*, for surely news of all other leaders must have reached their homes.—Plato, *Euthyd.* 302 C. "Unhappy man," says Dionysodorus to Socrates, "not to have a *θεὸς πατρῷος*. Why everybody has one." Such is the implication.

In the following my interpretation is at least possible. Hdt. 1. 71: *τί σφεας ἀπαιρήσειαι τοῖσί γε μή ἐστι μὴδέν*. We have just been told that the Persians (*σφεας*) have nothing. Other nations may have nothing, but the comparison is between Croesus and the Persians. "What can you, who have so much, get from them, *the ones who* (in comparison with you) have nothing?"—Antiph. 5. 65: *μὴ τοίνυν ἐμοὶ νείμῃτε τὸ ἄπορον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ μὴδ' ἂν αὐτοὶ ἠύπορεύετε*. It has just been argued that the judges themselves could not answer if they were asked something they did not know. They would have no difficulty in clearing themselves of the murder in other respects, but they could not, any more than the accused, give a plausible account of how the murder took place. This, then, is *the one ἀπορία* for both judges and accused.—Isocr. 8. 110: *περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν . . . περὶ ἧς μὴδὲς πώποτ' αὐτοῖς λογισμὸς εἰσῆλθεν*. The general course of the argument has made it plain that no one has stopped to consider whether *ἀρχή* is a good thing or not. As compared with matters of everyday life, *ἐν οἷς αἰεὶ ζῶσι*, it is *the thing* to which no one has given thought.—Eur. *I. A.* 823: *οὐ θαυμά σ' ἡμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, οἷς μὴ πάρος προσῆκες*. Clytaemnestra has brought Iphigeneia to Aulis to marry Achilles. She has just come upon the stage and addressed him, and the words quoted are in answer to his *τήνδε τίνα λεύσσω ποτὲ γυναῖκα*; That "me whom you have never seen (*κατεῖδες*) before" is not the meaning might be inferred from *πῶς γὰρ κάτοιδ' ὃν γ' εἶδον οὐδεπώποτε* Soph. *Philoct.* 250, where the negative is *οὐ*. I understand *οἷς μὴ πάρος προσῆκες* as *your new relation*. It is clear from Achilles' words, *αἰσχρὸν δέ μοι γυναῖξὶ συμβάλλειν λόγους* (830) and *αἰδοί-*

μεθ' ἂν Ἀγαμέμνον', εἰ ψαύοιμεν ὧν μή μοι θέμις, that he is not expected to know any free woman outside of his own family, so that he could not know Clytaemnestra "the one (of the family) to whom he was not before related."

A related type of sentence is this from Dem. 20. 161: *μή καὶ τὰ μέλλοντ' ἦδεις; ὅτι νῆ Δία πόρρω τοῦ τι τοιοῦτ' ἐλπίζαν ἐσμέν. καὶ εἶμην γ' ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. ἀλλὰ χρὴ γ' ἀνθρώπους ὄντας τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγειν καὶ νομοθετεῖν, οἷς μηδεὶς ἂν νεμεσήσαι, καὶ τὰγαθὰ μὲν προσδοκᾶν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχεσθαι δίδόναι; πάντα δ' ἀνθρώπιν' ἡγέεσθαι.* Kühner-Gerth, II. 185, gives *τοιοῦτος ὅς μή* as the proper construction "wenn der Nebensatz eine Bestimmung enthält." Now the antecedent in this sentence is not indefinite in the sense that we do not know what it is until the relative clause explains it. The optative with ἂν should put us on our guard against classing this with the ordinary indefinite relative clause with μή. The meaning of *τοιαῦτα* is clear before the relative clause is spoken. *τοιαῦτα* is *ἀνθρώπινα*. "We, being men, must legislate what is proper to men." Only *ἀνθρώπινα* as opposed to *θεῖα*, are, on the part of men, things *οἷς μηδεὶς ἂν νεμεσήσαι*. In this, then, and the following examples the relative clause refers to one of two classes which the preceding context has already defined. The negative is μή and the fact contained in the relative clause has already been stated or is known to everyone, as in the passage above. The antecedent is usually a form of *τοιοῦτος*, and the optative with ἂν is the most frequent predicate. Examples are: Dem. 20. 144. *τοιοῦτον* is the law of Leptines. For the fact stated compare *οὐδὲν αὐτὸς ποιεῖν ἀγαθὸν παρεσκευασθαι δόξει*. Leptines' law is opposed to the class of law that rewards benefactors.—Dem. 23. 86: *ὁ γράφων ἰδίᾳ τι Χαριδήμῳ τοιοῦτον, ὃ μὴ πᾶσι καὶ ὑμῖν ἔσται*. Laws must apply to all. This private one for Charidemus is of the other class.—Andoc. 3. 41: *μύνησθε μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἡμετέρους λόγους, ψηφίσασθε δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν ὑμῖν μηδέποτε μεταμελήσει*. It is a choice between peace and war. The whole speech has advised peace. The closing words do not tell the audience to choose what *they think* they will not regret, but to remember what he has said and choose accordingly; peace, according to the argument, is the one of the two courses that will not be regretted.—Andoc. 4. 12: *τοιοῦτον προστάτην* is the type of statesman like Alcibiades, who wants to please the crowd and takes no thought of the future. Aristides is the



opposite type. The fair taxes that he had levied on the allies have been doubled by Alcibiades and they will inevitably side with the Lacedaemonians in the next war.—Isocr. 3. 16. As a form of government the tyranny (τοιαύτης) is contrasted with oligarchies and democracies. The preceding sentence states that the tyrant observes the good qualities of men.—Isocr. 4. 189. μεγάλα and μικρά are contrasted. It is self-evident that talk of trivial (τοιαῦτα) things will be of advantage to no one.—Thuc. 6. 11. 1. Some peoples you can conquer and hold, some you can conquer and not hold. It is foolish to attack the latter class. This example differs from the rest in that the relative clause, instead of giving the characteristic quality of one of the two classes, defines the class again.—Aristoph. *Frogs* 1459: τοιαύτην πόλιν is Athens, which dislikes both χρηστοί and πονηροί citizens (1456). Other cities can get along with one or the other class.—Plato, *Rep.* 605 E. The two classes are the heroes of the epic and tragedy who lament openly in misfortune, and, the type that we emulate, the men that bear their grief in silence.—The remaining three examples do not have τοιοῦτος. Isocr. 10. 10: ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις προσποιόιτο κράτιστος εἶναι τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἐνταῦθα καταβαίνων, οὐ μὴδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος ἀξιώσειεν. ἐνταῦθα gets its meaning from ἐν οἷς ἅπαντές εἰσιν ἀνταγωνισταί, of which it is the opposite. In the sentence "he entered the lists (on a particular occasion) where (=in a place where) no one else would compete" οὐδεὶς would be the proper word; in "he (regularly) entered the lists where no one else would compete," a general relative clause, the optative without ἂν would be necessary.—Plato, *Laws* 872 D: ξυγγενῶν αὐτόχειρας φόνους . . . οἱ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν κακῶς οἰκούσαις καὶ τρεφομέναις γίνονται πόλεσι, γένοιτο δ' ἂν πού τι καὶ ἐν ἧ μὴ ποτέ τις ἂν προσδοκήσειε χώρα. Here κακῶς οἰκούσαις πόλεσι prepares us for its opposite, to which ἐν ἧ κτέ. refers.—*Phileb.* 20 A: παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῶν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.—τίνα λέγεις;—εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλον καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυνάμεθ' ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. The argument has come to a stop. Protarchus suggested in 19 B that neither he nor Philebus could answer the questions asked. Now he tells Socrates that, since he had promised to reach a satisfactory conclusion, it was for him to abandon his present method of asking questions they can't answer. It seems to be intimated that, if Socrates' question system is to be con-

tinued, he had better try the kind they can answer. As the optative with *ἄν* indicates, this is not an ordinary conditional relative clause. In the conditional relative clause the action of the verb is *prior* to that of the principal clause; here *ἄν μὴ δυναίμεθ' ἄν κτέ.* is the object of *ἀνερωτῶν*.

The next three examples are of a different kind because what precedes gives no idea of the meaning of the *τοιοῦτο* (*τούτο*); it is defined by the relative clause. Isocr. 4. 89: *βουλευθεὶς δὲ τοιοῦτον μνημεῖον καταλιπεῖν, ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεώς ἐστιν*; Hdt. 4. 166: *ιδὼν Δαρεῖον ἐπιθυμῶντα μνημόσυνον ἑωυτοῦ λιπέσθαι τούτο τὸ μὴ ἄλλω εἴη βασιλεῖ κατεργασμένον*; cf. Hdt. 2. 135. The indicative in Isocrates makes it clear that the optative in the two Herodotus passages is due to the past tense of the principal verb—so-called “implied indirect discourse.” There is no *futurity* in the optative. The clause is not a *conditional* relative, for the meaning is not “whatever has not been made, that he desires to make.” In “he desires to make something that has not been made” the relative clause is *posterior*, not *prior*; it is dependent upon *he desires*, and, that being so, a statement of fact with *οὐ* by the writer is out of place. The *μὴ* here does not differ from that in *τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ ὧν μὴτ' αὐτὸς χείρων εἶναι δόξεις* Isocr. 11. 49. Goodwin, *M. T.* § 576, cites this last passage with the statement that the *future indicative*, with negative *μὴ*, “may denote a result which is *aimed at*,” but, as the other examples show, after such expressions of *desire*, *μὴ* is necessary with other tenses also. Of the six sentences with *μὴ* after *τοιαῦτα* cited by Goodwin in § 576 I have classed four with those in which the *τοιαῦτα* is defined by what precedes. The sixth is *οὔτοι δὲ τοιαῦτ' ἀπαγγελοῦσι παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ ὑποσχέσονται, ἐξ ὧν μὴδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν ἢ κινηθήσονται* Dem. 19. 324. Here the *μὴ* can be explained as expressing the intention of Philip. The meaning is “I will see to it that they carry such a report that the Athenians will not move” rather than “they are going to carry a report of such a kind that (I prophesy) the Athenians will not move.” The latter sense would be expressed by *οὐ* as in *εἰσι κακούσας γ' ἐμοῦ τοιαῦθ' ἃ τὸν τοῦδ' οὐ ποτ' εὐφρανεῖ βίον* Soph. *O. C.* 1353. A good example of an *οὐ* after a *τοιαῦτα* already defined, but where the relative clause makes a *new* statement and the *τοιαῦτα* does not refer to *one of two* defined classes, is *οὐκ οἶα ἐξεληλέγχθαι ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουντωνί* Plato, *Gorg.* 473 E.

I feel inclined to make some remarks upon the examples of *ὅτε μή* in Attic prose because of their resemblance in one important respect to the idioms that have been discussed. Kühner-Gerth, II. 447, says "*μή* findet sich nur dann, wenn das zeitliche Verhältnis zugleich auch als ein hypothetisches aufzufassen ist wie Pl. *Phaedo* 84 e *ἢ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι . . . ὅτε γε μήδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν.*" Smyth, § 1490, has "the negative is *μή* only when the temporal relation is regarded as conditional (indefinite)." I do not know what *indefinite* means here. In *Phaedo* 84 E Socrates has just failed to convince Simmias, and he makes his statement with circumstances, as they are at that moment, in mind. It might be claimed that we have here a *universal present*, but the meaning is very different from *whenever not*. And *ὅτε μή* is not *hypothetical*. At least in *Phaedo* 84 E (as in the other cases) it differs from *εἰ μή* in that it is expressly admitted that he can not persuade, whereas *εἰ μή* would leave that in doubt. Our natural translation of this *ὅτε* is *since*, and it is called *causal*. But the name is unsatisfactory: *ὅτε* is never equal to *ὅτι*. I should prefer to say that *ὅτε*, when not strictly temporal, implies that the *circumstances* of the subordinate clause are *simultaneous* with those of the principal clause. All cases of *ὅτε μή* resemble those of *ὅς μή* previously discussed in that the fact stated in the *ὅτε*-clause has just been stated and does not need to be asserted again. But the relation of the principal clause is also of a special kind. The rule is: *ὅτε μή* is used when the *ὅτε*-clause gives the circumstances that are admitted to exist, the principal clause the circumstances that are the natural accompaniment (not, *result*): "this being (admittedly) so, this other thing is (inevitably) so." In *ἀπόλοιο ὦ πόλεμε, ὅτ' οὐδὲ κολάσ' ἔξεστί μοι τοὺς οἰκέτας* *Clouds* 7, the *ὅτε*-clause gives the reason for cursing the war; but, as Strepsiades is talking to himself and knows that he dare not flog his slaves, *ὅτε μή* could be correct in "of course they sleep as long as they like when I can't flog them." The *ὅτε* in *Clouds* 7 is more strongly *temporal* than in the *ὅτε μή* examples. There is a closer parallel to the latter in Soph. *Ajax* 1231, where, however, *οὐδὲν ὦν* is justified because, though Teucer's birth is well known, Agamemnon is vehemently asserting that he is a nobody. Additional examples of *ὅτε μή* will be found in Dem. 7. 7, 20. 24,

22. 71, Isaeus 11. 29, Plato, *Rep.* 354 C, 610 E. ὅτε μή suggests its opposite. "Circumstances" are divided into two parts, (a) "when these things are not so," (b) "when these things are so" (ὅτε τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει Dem. 1. 1). ὅτε οὐ, whether the ὅτε is temporal or 'circumstantial' (with οὐ time is apt to be involved), simply makes a statement about a certain time or certain circumstances without a suggestion about other times and circumstances. For example, ὅτε οὐ would be right in "He called between seven and eight, when (I inform you) I was not in"; and this could be said even though one was out between three and four also; but ὅτε μή, if it were correctly applied to the hour between seven and eight as the time when I was *not* in, would carry with it the suggestion that I *was* in during the rest of the day.

If the meaning just given to ὅτε μή is correct the same theory should be applicable to those cases of μή with a circumstantial participle which are plainly not hypothetical. In οὗτος μὲν ἀνοσίῳ μόρῳ τετελεύτηκε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντοῦ οἰκησάτων · τοῦτου δὲ μηκέτι ἐόντος . . . γίνεται μοι ἀναγκαϊότατον Hdt. 3. 65 the genitive absolute "he being no longer alive" is directly preceded by the statement of the man's death, and the relation of the two clauses is expressed by "this being (admittedly) so, this other thing is naturally so." Similar is εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε · νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰς · μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνὸς ὀρθότερόν ἐστι Plato *Symp.* 180 C. Compare Antiph. 2. β. 4; Thuc. 1. 86. 3, 7. 73. 4; Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 5, 12, *Hell.* 6. 1. 12, *Cyrop.* 3. 1. 37, 6. 3. 15; Lys. 12. 29; Isocr. 17. 52; Isaeus 3. 72, 5. 16; Dem. 36. 6, 39. 35. The μή itself in these sentences doubtless has exactly the same meaning as with the so-called conditional participle; but, instead of trying to see a conditional idea where there is none, or maintaining that cause and condition are essentially the same, it would be well at times to look at the matter from the other point of view. μή is used with the conditional participle not because it is conditional but because the requirements for μή are present when the participle is what we call conditional; and, if the same requirements are present at times with a participle that is not conditional, μή is none the less the proper particle. Similarly ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν is usually generic, but under the proper conditions it may refer to a definite individual, though the force of the μή in the two cases does not differ.



With the articular participle *οὐ* is more difficult to explain than *μή*. In the singular, as *ὁ οὐκ ἀδικῶν*, the reference usually, perhaps, is to a definite individual, but there are a number of more or less puzzling cases where that rule does not work. In Plato, *Gorg.* 457 C, *ἐκάστος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρεῖᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον . . . ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα* there is really no difficulty, because the *τόν* is demonstrative; or, if you prefer, *τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον* refers to the preceding *ὁ δέ*, and is no longer the sweepingly general 'anyone that does not use rightly' like *οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι ὀρθῶς* in 457 A. Somewhat similar is *Gorg.* 459 B—*ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. — δῆλον ὅτι. — ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδοσὶ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ.* Though *ὁ ῥήτωρ* is quite general, that is, means *any orator*, *ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς*, being limited in its reference to *ὁ ῥήτωρ*, is better than *ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς*; for the latter is too sweeping, there being others than orators that do not know medicine. It may be objected that this interpretation does violence to my own rule, for there are two classes, *ὁ ῥήτωρ* and *ὁ ἱατρός*, and *ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς* may mean *the one of the two* that does not know. I admit that *ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς* seems to me a possible translation for "when the orator is more persuasive than the physician (in matters of health), the one of the two that does not know is more persuasive than the one that knows." What Plato has written may differ merely in emphasis on the negative—possibly the position of *ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς* at the beginning of the sentence has some effect—, the result being "A man, then, that does *not* know is more persuasive than one that does, when the orator, etc." A clear case of the need of *οὐ* to emphasize the negative is *οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὕρημένον* *Plato Rep.* 427 E. Bäumlein, *Griech. Partik.* p. 277, explains the *οὐ* on the ground that *τὸ οὐχ εὕρημένον* is "das Bestimmte, die Gerechtigkeit die wir . . . noch nicht gefunden haben." But that is to get ahead of Plato's argument; none of the four qualities have been found yet. This sentence is merely the general statement that "whatever part of the four shall have been found, the part that has not been found will be the remainder." According to the rule that *τὸ εὕρημένον* is *the found* *τὸ μὴ εὕρημένον* *the not found*, *μή* would seem to be in place here; but there is a real necessity for emphasis, for the meaning is,



"the thing we are in search of, the thing that is still *not* found, is the remainder." Another example with *οὐ* that does not refer to a definite person is *παισι δ' αὖ, ὅσοι τῶνδε πάρεστε, ἡ ἀδελφοῖς ὁρῶ μέγαν τὸν ἀγῶνα, τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ἅπας εἶωθεν ἐπαινεῖν* Thuc. 2. 45. 1. I can not accept the view that *ὁ οἰκ ὦν* is regular for *the dead*. I believe that a general statement, "everyone praises the dead," isolated from any context, should have *μή*. Here *μή* would be too general, because the idea is that everyone, in talking to a man that has lost a brother in the war, praises *the one that is dead* in reference to that particular man. Compare with this Eur. *Phoen.* 1320: *ἤκω μετὰ . . . Ἰοκάστην, ὅπως προθῆται οὐκέτ' ὄντα παῖδ' ἐμόν. τοῖς γὰρ θανοῦσι χρὴ τὸν οὐ τεθνηκότα τιμὰς διδόντα εὖσεβεῖν θεόν.* Bäumlein, p. 276, says "wegen spezieller Beziehung auf Jokaste und Kreon," but that is absurd, for *τοῖς θανοῦσι* is quite general. It is possible in this and in other cases, I believe, to realize the difference between *οὐ* and *μή* by the need of translating "it is needful that *some one who is not* dead pay honors to the dead." The plural *τοὺς μή τεθνηκότας* would be out of place here, for that would mean "the (whole) class of the living must honor the dead," whereas we need to think of a single individual paying the funeral rites. *τὸν μή τεθνηκότα* would be as unsuitable as in English *anyone who is not*. *τὸν μή* is, in its way, as much a plural as *τοὺς μή*; it will not let the mind rest upon a *single* person. *τὸν οὐ* is *singular*; it lets you think of but one person at a time, though no individual that can be named may be in mind.

In the plural *οὐ* is even more difficult, for *οἱ οὐ βουλόμενοι* *the ones who do not wish* suggests a *class* and *μή*, according to the hypothesis, is *generic*. It is useless to attempt to force the rule that the writer is thinking of definite persons when he uses *οὐ*. On *ψηφίζεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ὅρκους · ὅπερ καὶ συνέχει μόνον τὴν πόλιν, ἀκόντων τῶν οὐ βουλομένων ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν* And. 1. 9 Kühner-Gerth, II. p. 202, remarks "mit Bezug auf die bestimmte, als konkrete Einheit gefasste Partei." I should be inclined to say that, if the writer had in mind a definite party in the state *the not wishing*, who were opposed to another party, *the wishing*, *μή* would be just the right particle. It is characteristic of *οἱ μή* to suggest its opposite, which *οἱ οὐ* does not. Andocides means *in spite of people who*, not *that class who*. *οἱ οὐ* often lends itself to the translation *some people who*, a turn that is impossible for *οἱ μή*.

I shall comment on only two or three examples. In Plato, *Phaed.* 80 B, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ . . . καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ, we have a simple case of *generic μή*; the same phrase has οὐ in 79 C, ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν . . . τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα. The reason for the difference is that when we take a particular example, as *where the soul tries to examine something by using the eyes*, even though ὅταν is *general* in its reference, the sweeping generality of εἰς τὰ μηδέποτε κτέ. is no longer possible: "When the soul tries to examine anything with the eyes, it is drawn among (some) *things that are not permanent*." In τῶν οὐκ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιγιγνώμενοί τισιν ἔσσονται Thuc. 2. 44. 3 τῶν οὐκ ὄντων are not *the dead* in general, but the particular dead in whom the people denoted by τισιν are interested. But if, instead of οἱ ἐπιγιγνώμενοί we had οἱ ὄντες as a contrast to *those who are not*, we might say τῶν μὴ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ὄντες ἡμῖν εἰσι with a direct reference to *our dead*; for the ἡμῖν restricts the two contrasted classes to those we are interested in. In Thucydides' sentence τῶν οὐκ ὄντων is not the opposite of οἱ ἐπιγιγνώμενοί and it is necessary to *describe* them as *those who have ceased to be*. There is a striking example of οὐ in Plato, *Gorg.* 459 C—δα . . . μηχανὴν τινα πιθοῦς εὐρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων. In 459 A there is a reference to the orator being persuasive ἐν ὄχλῳ, and this is defined as ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι. It is clear that ἐν ὄχλῳ could be used in 459 C, but οὐ has replaced μή. It seems to me that τῷ μὴ εἰδότηι *anyone that does not know* would be quite natural, and the only apparent objection to τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι is that, with τῶν εἰδότων in the same clause, τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι ought to mean *the whole class that does not know, everybody that does not know*, a meaning that would be unsuitable. With the more limited τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι compare ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται in 459 B with the article omitted.

ὁ μὴ (εἰδὼς) is *generic*, but it may refer to one particular person who can be named, if that person is the only one of his kind in a defined group. ὁ οὐκ (εἰδὼς) refers to *one* person, often to a person that can be named; but its meaning is far from being so *definite* as this in many cases. When the context limits the reference to *some one* person (not *any* person), even

though no greater definiteness is attained (so far as *naming* is concerned) than by the English *someone*, οὐ may be the correct particle. οἱ μὴ εἰδότες refers to the whole class of *men that do not know*, suggesting the opposite class, *men that know*, the two classes together composing *all*, whether all humanity or all of a group defined in the context. It may be so *definite* that the writer could name every man in the class, while οἱ οὐκ εἰδότες may be used without the writer being able to name a single person that does not know. Of πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν . . . καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε (Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 4) it is correct to say that τοῖς μὴ πειθομένοις means *any who did not take his advice*; but I should not venture to add, with Goodell § 582, "τοῖς οὐ πειθομένοις would have meant *those people*, a definite class, *who in fact did not take his advice*." My own idea is that in such a context οὐ would not be Greek; and without a context such phrases as these cannot be defined exactly.

A. G. LAIRD.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

### III.—SINGLE WORD VERSUS PHRASE.

The object of this paper is the discussion of a problem of semantic equivalence. That problem is to discover why, to express a concept, a single word is used in some instances and a clause or phrase in others. The single words considered will be chiefly nouns and adjectives. The material for investigation was taken in the first instance from Plautus, *Rudens*, and Cicero, *Ad Familiares*, III; but it has been augmented by examples from other sources whenever they seemed pertinent.

The most convenient starting-point for the discussion is the participle, especially the present participle. A participle whose context does not impose upon it any necessary limitation of time, cause, manner, concession, or other of the specific meanings according to which participles are generally classified in grammars, might be called an undifferentiated participle. Though subject to the influence of the meaning of the stem, it contains the possibility of any of the more specific meanings. It is seldom, however, that the participle is found in this purely fluid condition; it generally receives from its context a tendency in one direction rather than another. *Ad. Fam.*, III, 11, 2: *Complexus igitur sum cogitatione te absentem*; "absentem" is here in an undifferentiated state, "in your absence"; a slight change of context would justify "though absent," "because absent." *Ru.* 71: *Vehemens sum exorians, quom occido vehementior*; "exorians" is clearly defined as a temporal participle because of "quom occido" in the following clause. *Ad Fam.* III, 6, 4: *quum interea, credo equidem, malevoli homines (late enim patet hoc vitium et est in multis), sed tamen probabilem materiam nacti sermonis, ignari meae constantiae, conabantur alienare a te voluntatem meam*; here "nacti" might be defined as of attendant circumstance, but has a causal implication. *Ibid.* 10, 10: *qua humanitate tulit contentionem meam pro Milone, adversantem interdum actionibus suis; adversantem is clearly concessive, the note of concession being struck in qua humanitate tulit.* In *ibid.* 12, 2: *itaque quemadmodum expediam exitum huius institutae orationis non reperio, "institutae" might be rendered "though I have begun it."*

A participle is potentially a clause, but it requires further definition from its context. Any adjective, also, may be expanded into a clause; but the participle, being in general somewhat less definite than the adjective, disintegrates rather more readily. A good example is given above of the participle balanced against a temporal clause: Ru. 71 *vehemens sum exoricens quom occido vehementior*; cf. *ibid.* 771 *quom coniecturam egomet mecum facio* with Cic. *De Oratore*, I, 1 *cogitanti mihi saepenumero et memoria vetera repetenti*. In the same way an adjective may be expanded into a clause, though with this difference, that the adjective will remain itself as one element in the analytical expression or give place to some similar word, usually an adjective, while the participle is actually broken up by the use of the appropriate finite verb. Plautus furnishes many examples of the use of a clause where the simple adjective would seem sufficient: Ru. 26/7: *facilius si qui pius est a dis supplicans / quam qui scelestus inveniet veniam sibi*; *ibid.*, 290, *omnibus modis qui pauperes sunt homines miseri vivont*.

In a previous article<sup>1</sup> I have discussed the frequent semantic equivalence of the adjective and the participle, and also the use of the noun as a participle. The equivalence of adjectival and participial terminations may be seen in such examples as Ru. 409: *timidas, egenteis, uvidas, eiectas, exanimatas* (where participle and adjective are mixed together in such a way that any distinction in the semantic value of their terminations must be made on the ground of their use in other contexts), and in words such as *adolescens, sapiens*, or the like, of participial formation, but used chiefly as nouns or adjectives. In the latter instances the use of the participle as a noun may be studied; the use of the noun as a participle may be seen, e. g., in Ru. 225/6: *neque eam usquam invenio, neque quo eam neque quo quaeram consultumst / neque quem rogitem responsorem quemquam interea convenio*; here "responsorem" is a specialized "responsurum."

A prepositional phrase may be used as the semantic equivalent of an adjective; Cic. *ad Fam.* III, 10, 1: *quod nihil tam praeter opinionem meam accidere potuit*; *id. Ac.* 2, 4, 10: *non . . . conturbat me expectatio tua, etsi nihil est eis, qui*

<sup>1</sup> A. J. P., XL, pp. 373-395, Verbals in -tor, -ax, -dus, and -ns.



placere volunt, tam adversarium. In each instance there is a qualifier of "nihil"; but in one instance this qualifier is put in the form of a word, in the other in that of a prepositional phrase.<sup>2</sup> In "tam praeter opinionem meam" the pronominal adjective is not otiose, and could not readily be drawn into a compound, but the phrase would be intelligible without "meam" as easily as in *Nepos*, *Milt.*, 2, 5: *etsi praeter opinionem res ceciderat*. "Opiniosus"<sup>3</sup> is doubtful in *Cicero*, and would mean "fixed in opinion, obstinate." "Opinabilis" occurs first in *Cicero*, and seems quasi-technical. "Inopinus" is poetic and late. "Inopinabilis" occurs first in *Gellius*, and is not always technical; e. g. *XVII*, 9, 18: *est et alia in monumentis rerum Graecarum profunda quaedam et inopinabilis latebra, barbarico astu excogitata*. "Inopinatus" occurs in *Cicero*, both as an adjective and, in its neuter form, as a noun: *Par. V*, 1, 35, *nec hoc tam re est quam dictu inopinatum atque mirabile*, and *Tusc. III*, 31, 76, *nihil inopinati accidisse*. Here, then, no difference can be found in meaning between "inopinatum" and "praeter opinionem"; "meam" makes the expression somewhat more specific, and cannot apparently be incorporated in the phrase when the latter is reduced to adjectival form; though it is so easy to understand the pronominal adjective that no substantial difference is made if it is omitted except where it is emphatic.<sup>4</sup> *Plautus* furnishes a good example

<sup>2</sup> The agreement would run on parallel lines if "tam praeter opinionem" were taken adverbially, as modifying "accidere."

<sup>3</sup> *Ac.* 2, 47, 143.

<sup>4</sup> "Praeter opinionem" would be spoken of as two words, "inopinabilis" or "inopinatum" as one. This difference in nomenclature marks a correct, formal distinction. From a semantic point of view there may be no difference. Postgate (*Bréal, Semantics*, translated by Cust, *Appendix*, p. 329) proposes to call the expression of a single idea or notion a "rheme." This terminology, however, while it might be convenient for an investigator, would probably prove confusing; because ideas, notions, or things, themselves of varying complexity, are defined as one by us for the purposes of our convenience. Cf. *Sidgwick*, "The Use of Words in Reasoning," *Chap. II*, § 13, "It is in our habit of viewing facts which admit of being concisely described as simple facts that the danger chiefly resides; and the convenience—amounting in some cases to little short of necessity,—which justifies this habit merely increases its effective misleading force." It is difficult to say what is a word (cf. *Wundt, Völkerpsychologie*, I, pp. 599 ff., and *Bloomfield*,

of semantic equivalence between "insperata" and "praeter spem": Ru. 400: *nam multa praeter spem scio multis bona evenisse*, and Most. 197: *insperata accidunt magis saepe quam quae speres*.

Ru. 704: *te ex concha natam esse autumant*; *ibid.* 739-41: *quid ego ex te audio? hanc Athenis esse natam liberam. / mea popularis, obsecro, haec est? non tu Cyrenensis es? / immo Athenis natus, altusque educatusque Atticis*. Here there is an exact equivalence between "Athenis natam" and "Cyrenensis," and a less close parallel between either of these expressions and "ex concha natam." "Cyrenensis" might be translated "born at Cyrene"; but that is because of its context—"Athenis natam" preceding, and "Athenis natus" following. The termination *-ensis* may, on occasion, be the equivalent of "natus" with the ablative, with or without a preposition. In itself, it is not so specific. It may mean "dwelling at," or "presiding over," as Ru. 615: *pro Cyrenenses populares*, and *ibid.* 713: *de senatu Cyrenensi quemvis opulentum virum*. "\*Conchensis" could be understood as an attribute of Venus; but an example of an *-ensis* adjective formed upon the stem of a common noun and meaning "born at" seems not to occur.<sup>5</sup>

Ru. 315: *qui tres secum homines duceret, c(h)lamydatos cum machaeris*; cf. Cic. ad Quint. frat. 2, 8, 2: *machaerophoris centum sequentibus*. "Chlamys" and "machaera" are both found in Plautus. A prepositional phrase is used in Ru. 315 probably because the added detail came into the speaker's mind after "chlamydatos"; that is, the phrase represents an added act of associative thinking. He had men with him—they wore the chlamys—and they had daggers. Cf. Pl. Ps. 158: *te cum securi caudicali*; Ov. Met. XII, 460: *securiferumque Pyracten*; Val. Flac. 5, 138: *securigeras . . . catervas*. In view of "chlamydatos," "clypeatus," and others, "\*machaeratus" could scarcely have been a cause of hesitation to Plautus.

"The Study of Language," pp. 103 ff.), and not less difficult to say what is a thing. This fact is one cause of the persistent intrusion of metaphysics into grammar.

<sup>5</sup>The *-ensis* adjectives formed upon common-noun stems listed in Gradenwitz have been examined as far as they could be traced in Harper's Lexicon. They are not numerous, and are frequently not classical.

In Cic. ad Fam. III, 5, 1: *ibi mihi praesto fuit L. Lucilius cum litteris mandatisque tuis*, "cum" discharges a more important function than in "*cum machaeris*" above. Here the use of a single word in place of the phrase "*cum litteris mandatisque tuis*" is so difficult as to be practically impossible in Latin for several reasons. In the first place, the pronominal adjective offers a difficulty, as noticed above; secondly, the adjectives formed from "*littera*" in classical times derive their meaning from "*litterae*" "learning," or "*littera*" "a letter of the alphabet," and not from "*litterae*" "a letter, epistle"; thirdly, the dvandva compound is scarcely to be found in Latin.<sup>6</sup> When the necessity for some convenient term for "a postman" was felt, "*tabellarius*" was formed from "*tabellae*," probably because adjectives formed from "*litterae*" had been appropriated for other uses.

Cic. ad Fam. III, 4, 1: *pridie nonas Iunias cum essem Brundisi litteras tuas accepi*; *ibid.* 10, 2: *Q. Servilius perbrevis mihi a te litteras reddidit*; *ibid.* 1, 2: *ut mihi reddidit a te litteras plenas et amoris et officii*; in such examples as these, the preposition seems to be used where there is some emphasis on the actual transmission of the letters,<sup>7</sup> though "*accipere*" is used with the adjective where "*a te*" might have been expected on the analogy of "*reddere a te*." A good example of the use of a prepositional phrase which would be difficult to reduce to a single word because it mentions details that would not in the nature of things occur with great frequency is ad Fam. III, 9, 1: *quas ex itinere antequam ex Asia egressus es ad me litteras misisti unas de legatis a me prohibitis proficisci, alteras de Appianorum aedificatione impedita, legi perinventus*.

Ad Fam. III, 7, 3: *quid habuit iniquitatis me scribere ne facerent antequam ego rem causamque cognossem? non poteram, credo, ante hiemem*. Here the adverbial clause "*antequam ego rem causamque cognossem*" is balanced by "*ante hiemem*"; substitute for "*hiemem*" "*quam hiems venisset*" and the parallel is complete; this is however unnecessary; "*ante*

<sup>6</sup>Lindsay, L. L., p. 361.

<sup>7</sup>An examination of all the examples of the type "*tuas litteras*," "*litterae a te*" in Cic. ad Fam. III, yielded nothing of interest except the fact that a preposition was used wherever "*reddere*" appeared in the phrase.

*hiemem*” performs the necessary function quite as well, is briefer, and rhetorically quite as effective. Why have an adverbial clause in the one case and a preposition with its noun in the other? It will not do to say that “*hiems*” expresses a concept less complex than that expressed by the clause. Its lesser complexity is merely a matter of phonetics; semantically “*hiems*” is quite as complex as the clause against which it is balanced. The phenomena summed up in “*hiems*” are of frequent occurrence and considerable importance; a name must be found for this body of phenomena, and is found by taking what was originally the name of the most noticeable object of the winter. For the “*antequam*” clause, “*ante meam cognitionem*” might logically and etymologically have been substituted; but “*cognitio*” has a technical connotation. Nor is the clause quoted particularly definite in character; not more so than “*aedilitas*” in “*aedilitas mea*,” Cic., Att. 12, 17: *ante aedilitatem meam*. It is, however, of relatively infrequent occurrence. This seems to be the reason for the use of the clause. In such a clause as ad Fam. III, 6, 4: *antequam in provinciam veni*, nothing would be gained in explicitness and something would be lost in brevity by the substitution of “*ante meum in provinciam adventum*.” “*Adventus in provinciam*” is not reduced to univocal form,<sup>8</sup> though the concept occurs frequently; probably because some genitive or adjective is required to make the meaning explicit.

Ad Fam. III, 6, 5: *eoque ad te tardius scripsi, quod cotidie te ipsum exspectabam, cum interea ne litteras quidem ullas accepi quae me docerent quid ageres aut ubi te visurus essem*; Cicero wrote to Claudius after some delay; the cause of the delay is given in the *quod* clause; “*exspectabam*” is modified by the *cum* clause. Cause may be expressed in a single word, but in such instances the context furnishes the implication of cause; e. g. Hor. Carm. I, 5, 9: *qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea*; since he is inexperienced (*credulus*), he thinks you all gold. So “*prudens*” Hor. Serm. II, 3, 206: *prudens placavi sanguine divos*; so probably “*cari*,” Hor. Carm. I, 24, 2: *Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus / tam cari capitis*, i. e., since it is so dear.

<sup>8</sup>I have ventured to use the word “univocal” to avoid circumlocution, though I am not aware that it appears in any standard dictionary. It serves as another illustration of my thesis.

Concession also may be expressed in one word, especially such a word as "invitus," which readily carries such implication; ad Fam. III, 10, 3: coactus a me invitissimo decessisset; *ibid.* XIII, 63: eum ego a me invitissimus dimisi.<sup>9</sup> In the clause quoted above (ad Fam., III, 6, 5) the *quod* clause is used because the idea to be expressed is specific, and of insufficiently frequent occurrence to have obtained a separate word for its expression. So in the *cum* clause the concept to be expressed does not frequently occur; the object of "docerent" is complex, each separate secondary object being a clause, and the second clause itself complicated by both "ubi" and "te." That is, while everything in the sentence except "ad te scripsi" modifies "scripsi," the whole, which presents itself to the mind as one concept when the idea is grasped, is far too complex to be expressed by one word; and the separate parts of the concept, in the same way, are either too complex or too specific. If the total concept were one that came into the mind frequently without any change, in time, no doubt, a more convenient form of expression would have been found. A briefer expression of cause, though still too complex to be put into one word, is found in such phrases as ad Fam. III, 9, 4, *sed id feci adductus auctoritate et consilio tuo*.

A concept of some complexity expressed in one word is found in almost any abstract term that means anything; e. g. "urbanitas," as in ad Fam. III, 9, 1: *aspectus videlicet urbis tibi tuam pristinam urbanitatem reddidit*; the analysis of this concept would be found to yield among other things a pleasant emotional ingredient. Cf. *ibid.* III, 7, 5: *homo, mea sententia, summa prudentia, multa etiam doctrina, plurimo rerum usu, addo urbanitatem, quae est virtus*. *Ibid.* III, 8, 4: *nihil addidi, nisi quod publicani me rogarunt, cum Samum ad me venissent, ut de tuo edicto totidem verbis transferrem in meum*. In the foregoing example, what Cicero added is not directly stated, but hinted in descriptive detail. Plaut. Ru. 601/2: *videtur ad me simia aggredirier / rogare scalas ut darem utendas sibi*; the sentence appears somewhat pleonastic, but is not absolutely so. In the context, "scalas" would be understood without "ut darem

<sup>9</sup> In such a clause as Cic. Par. 5, 1: *solus igitur hoc contingit sapienti ut nihil faciat invitus*, the idea of concession is scarcely felt.



utendas sibi"; but *rogare* prefers a clause to a noun as inner object. What has happened here, probably on account of the limitations of usage, is that the concept has been rather fully expressed, instead of being indicated by one word.

The terms "complex" and "specific," each of which is of course relative, have been used with this distinction: a concept is complex when it contains various elements, any one of which is incomplete without reference to the others; it is specific when its chief use is to hold clearly in view some detail which is necessary to express the dominant idea of the speaker. Specific clauses do not necessarily exclude complexity. The difference is often chiefly a difference of emphasis. Ru. 1110: *ubi sunt signa qui parentes noscere haec possit suos*; the clause "*qui . . . suos*" is not more complex than "*militaria*" in "*signa militaria*." It is more specific, limiting the application of "*signa*" to the purpose then in hand. It did not secure univocal expression, presumably because it did not occur frequently enough.

Cic. *pro Milone*, 54: (quoted in another connection by Postgate, p. xxix, Preface to Cust's translation of Bréal's *Semantics*) *si haec non gesta audiretis, sed picta videretis, tamen appareret uter esset insidiator, uter nihil cogitaret mali*: in the phrases "*esset insidiator*" and "*nihil cogitaret mali*," "*insidiator*" is a noun, which indicates precisely enough the performer of a certain kind of action, sufficiently frequent to require and obtain a separate classification and name; "*nihil cogitaret mali*" expresses a much wider and vaguer concept, including here the idea of "non-insidiator." There is no noun to signify definitely a non-planner of evil. A negative prefix is readily adopted by adjectives, but scarcely at all by nouns.<sup>10</sup> In this instance "*esset insidiator*" is really more specific than "*nihil cogitaret mali*." The two concepts are analyzed into speech by different methods. Ru. 538/9: *qui auderem tecum in navem*

<sup>10</sup> See Lindsay, L. L., p. 615. There are some interesting examples of semi-agglutination of the negative with the noun in Greek; e. g., Eur. Hipp. 196-7 *δι' ἀπειροσύνην ἄλλου βιότου | οὐκ ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ὑπὸ γαίας*, Thuc. I, 137: *καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν . . . τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν*; *ibid.*, III, 95: *διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν*; *ibid.* V, 35: *κατὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ἀλλήλοισι οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν*. See also H. A. Hamilton, *The Negative Compounds in Greek* (J. H. U. diss.), pp. 31 f.

ascendere / qui a fundamento mi usque movisti mare? Here "qui . . . mare" states a specific detail which is of importance to Charmides. It is somewhat akin in tenor to ἐνοσίγαιος. The latter, however, denotes a regular attribute of Poseidon, and has received univerbal expression. The former denotes an isolated occurrence, states it explicitly, and was not generalized into an epithet. Ru. 892/3: bene factum et volup est me hodie his mulierculis / tetulisse auxilium; grammatically speaking, "tetulisse" is the subject of "est"; psychologically, the whole concept expressed in "me . . . auxilium" is a unit; it expresses one act of Daemones, and is not more complex than "amatio," Ru. 1204: nimis paene inepta atque odiosa eius amatiost. Ru. 1291/2: istic scelestus liber est, ego qui in mari prehendi / rete atque excepi vidulum ei darei negatis quicquam: here "istic scelestus" is balanced by "ego qui in mari prehendi rete atque excepi vidulum," and "liber est" by "ei darei negatis quicquam." "Scelestus" is emotional and not specific; while Gripus represents his own merit by recounting the achievement which has a bearing on the situation; so Trachalio is freed, but no reward is given to Gripus. If grasping a rope and pulling a box out of the sea were a matter of frequent occurrence, some convenient expression for the person performing the action would, arguing from the analogy of other nomina agentis, probably have arisen. The concept here expressed is not more complex than that represented by "sacrificulus" or "pollinctor," probably not more specific than that represented by the latter. Gripus is annoyed, and has no specific charge against Trachalio to balance the qui clause, so he says "scelestus," which here means nothing except that he does not like Trachalio. It should be noted further that the idea of concession is plainly implicit both in "scelestus" and in the qui clause. A somewhat similar balance of adjective and clause is found Ru. 920/1: nimis homo nilist quist piger . . . / vigilare decet hominem qui volt sua temperi conficere officia; there the qui clause is the antithesis to "piger"; there are several adjectives that might serve for the qui clause, e. g., "acer"; but the clause is more specific; it is the idea prominent in Gripus' mind (cf. 915, nam ut de nocte multa impigreque exsurrexi); the psychological, not the logical, antithesis to "piger" is required here; possibly, too, the decorative impulse

has something to do with the variety of expression. Cic. ad Fam. III, 4, 1: *meum studium erga te et officium tametsi multis iam rebus spero tibi esse cognitum, tamen in iis maxime declarabo quibus plurimum significare potuero tuam mihi existimationem et dignitatem carissimam esse*: to a hearer or reader acquainted with the circumstances to which Cicero refers, "multis" suggests a greater complexity than the relative clause, but the latter is specific—its precision is much greater than that of "multis"; though the concept expressed is rather complex, does not occur with great frequency, and has no univocal expression. Ad Fam. III, 10, 1: *multaque mihi veniebant in mentem quamobrem istum laborem tibi etiam honori putarem fore*, "quamobrem . . . fore" is not more complex than "salutaria," *ibid.* 8, 4: *quo in capite sunt quaedam nova salutaria civitatibus*"; it is more specific. Ru. 721: *extemplo hercle ego follem pugillatorium faciam*: "folles pugillatorius" is not more complex or specific than "gladius." It did not in Latin require mention so frequently; nor, historically, has "punching-bag" required mention in English as frequently as "sword." Ad. Fam. III, 3, 2: *ego C. Pomptinum, legatum meum, Brundisi exspectabam, eumque ante Kal. Iun. Brundisium venturum arbitrabar*; place is here expressed by a case form, time by a prepositional phrase. Further, the expression of time in analytical form differs from many instances in which a compound is used; e. g., Cic. ad Fam. XV, 4, 9: *ex antelucano tempore usque ad horam diei x*; Seneca, Epist. 65, 1: *hesternum diem divisi cum mala valetudine*; *antemeridianum illa sibi vindicavit*: *postmeridiano mihi cessit*. The list might be extended indefinitely.

As may be gathered from what has been said, the novelty or infrequency of occurrence of a concept may lead to its expression in a clause, while other concepts quite as complex and quite as specific find expression in one word. Ru. 965: *et qui invenit hominem novi, et dominus qui nunc est scio*; "inventor" does not appear in Plautus. Cf. *ibid.* 313/5 *adolecentem / . . . qui tres secum homines duceret*; "qui tres secum homines duceret" adds a simple detail to the picture, but a man does not lead three men with sufficient frequency, nor is the matter of sufficient importance, to warrant a special term for "leading three men." Terms such as *centurio* and *decurio*

developed because the concept represented by them was of sufficient importance and frequency of occurrence to need a convenient method of expression. The concept expressed above by "qui invenit" finds expression (though in a generalized form) in "inventor," Ter. Eun. 1035: o Parmeno mi, o mearum voluptatum omnium / inventor, inceptor, perfector, scis me, in quibus sum gaudiis? The free use of "inventor" may have been hampered by its technical or quasi-technical application.<sup>11</sup> Ru. 118/9: isti(c) infortunium qui praefestinet ubi erus adsit praeloqui; the concept in the qui clause is not more complex nor more specific than others expressed univervally; "he who hastens to speak before his master" should be no more difficult of univerval expression than "he who is learned in the law," or "he who heals the sick"; praefestinet adds one detail to the picture, but the concept does not occur frequently, nor is it important.

Thus far it would seem that the chances that any concept will be expressed in a single word rather than in a phrase are inversely as its complexity, precision, and infrequency of occurrence. Logically considered, thus much, at least, is true of adjectives and nouns. But language is primarily a matter not of logic, but of psychology, and psychology must take account of emotion.<sup>12</sup> Emotion may affect the expression of the concept

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hor. Serm. I, 10, 48: inventore minor; id., Carm. III, 30, 10-14: dicar . . . princeps; Quint. Inst. Orat. III, 7, 16: quae solus quis aut primus, aut certe cum paucis fecisse videatur; ibid. 18: afferent laudem liberi parentibus, urbes conditoribus, leges latoribus, artes inventoribus, necnon instituta quoque auctoribus.

<sup>12</sup> Adjectives, for example, might be classified as intellectual and emotional. The prevailing characteristic of the emotional adjective is its vagueness; a precise adjective must be intellectual; e. g., trilibris, longimanus. When such a term is used as an emotional adjective it loses precision. For example, "sescenta" Plaut. Ps. 632: quasi mihi non sescenta tanta soli soleant credier; "rotundus," Hor. Serm. II, 7, 86; in Greek, *τερπάρωνος*, Sim. 12, Bergk; so in such phrases as Plaut. Cas. 114, ex sterculino effosse, where emotional congruity makes the metaphor fitting. Cf. Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, p. 107: Ich unterscheide also am Worte dreierlei: 1. den begrifflichen Inhalt von grösserer oder geringerer Bestimmtheit . . . 2. den Nebensinn, 3. den Gefühlswert (oder Stimmungsgehalt); ibid. pp. 114-5: Von einigen Ausdrücken könnte man sagen, dass sie überhaupt nur Gefühlswert besässen, oder besser, dass ihr begrifflicher Inhalt ganz im Gefühlswert

in two ways: it may lead to the use of a blanket term, such as an emotional adjective; or it may lead to the statement of some detail of interest in analytic form for emphasis. The second method differs only in degree from any statement of detail in a relative clause, since this is always determined by the interest of the speaker; but in emotional statement unnecessary analyses are oftener made. A good example is Ru. 1291/2, analyzed above. "Scelestus" indicates merely Gripus' dislike of Trachalio; "qui in mari prehendi rete atque excepi vidulum" the act of the fruits of which he has, he thinks, been unjustly deprived. Such partial analysis of a concept by the addition of some detail of interest to give emphasis is common: Ru. 1236, *fiunt transennae ubi decipiuntur dolis*, or *ibid.* 28/9, *qui estis boni, / quique aetatem agitis cum pietate et cum fide*; in the latter example the *qui* clause is merely a restatement of "boni" to give emphasis.<sup>13</sup> Ru. 651-3 furnishes a good example of a statement that might logically have been made in one word. The epithets indicate the turning about of the concept in the mind of the speaker to find some process of analysis by which to make the expression of disgust more vigorous; finally he throws out the logical kernel in one word, which represents all that the concept logically contains. He throws this out after having prepared a suitable emotional atmosphere in his hearer's mind, as though in despair of getting epithets to do the subject justice: *fraudis, sceleris, parricidi, periuri plenis(sumus) / legirupa, impudens, impurus, inverecundis-sumus, / uno verbo absolvam lenost: quid illum porro praedicem?* "Turba" has a rather vague connotation; but Vergil's analysis of it in one well-known passage gives the logical details and excites the appropriate emotion with no waste of epithets;

aufgegangen sei. Bei Schimpfwörtern z. B. ist der grossen Menge die sie gebraucht, der eigentliche Sinn unbekannt . . . . Vielleicht beruht die kräftige, fast mystische Wirkung mancher Schimpfwörter gerade darauf, dass im Grunde kein Mensch mehr weiss, was sie eigentlich besagen.

"Under the influence of emotion it is easier to throw together epithets than to think consecutively. Epithets, however, make no appeal to the mind of an unprejudiced hearer. He wants to know the facts. So the plain statement of a case with well-chosen words is more effective than much mere rhetoric.



Aen. VI, 305 sqq.: huc omnis turba ad ripas effusa ruebat / matres atque viri, defunctaque corpora vita / magnanimum heroum, pueri innuptaeque puellae / impositique rogis iuvenes ante ora parentum. Vergil sees the crowd at the Styx. "Turba" merely classifies it generally; the specific details must be given by analysis, and the appropriate emotion by a proper choice of vocabulary. Examples of logical analysis for the purpose of description or definition are too common to discuss here. Outside of scientific treatises they do not often occur without some irrelevant or picturesque detail. See, e. g., Cicero's description of the Asiatic style, Bru. 95, 325.

Examples have been given above of concepts of some complexity and of others of considerable precision expressed unverbally. Those whose novelty requires expression by the use either of a clause or of a new word will be considered later. One case, however, will be examined here of the univocal expression of concepts that are complex, specific in that they are of definite, individual reference, and so infrequent in occurrence that one of them, at least, is quoted in Harper's *Lexicon* as a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*—Ad Fam. III, 7, 5: ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus quam ornamenta virtutis existimas? The obvious difficulty with words like "Appietas" or "Lentulitas" is that they presuppose for their comprehension acquaintance with a particular person, object, or event. Given such acquaintance, they are clear and forcible; and the more thorough the acquaintance of the hearer with the person, object, or event, and with the speaker, the more exactly can he analyze for himself the concept which they suggest. In the case of men and events whose fame is wide, they may be used to good effect with a large audience. "Johnsonian" is readily understood by the majority of educated, English-speaking people; its emotional quality must be inferred from the context. To Miss Jenkyns of Cranford it was a term of honor, stately, dignified; to some modern readers it means only turgid, sesquipedalian. Words of this sort are probably coined in every house at some time. Their range of use is at first confined to those who are acquainted with the circumstances of their origin.<sup>14</sup> The vast

<sup>14</sup> Zumal in Bevölkerungsgruppen, die abgeschlossen leben, bei Studenten, Soldaten, Handwerksburschen, gewinnen gewisse Ausdrücke

majority of them die out. Here and there one is preserved, and sometimes used and understood long after the occasion of its formation is forgotten. The adjective "Pickwickian" probably, the verb "burke" certainly, is used by those who have no notion of its origin.

There are two forms of expression in Latin which stand somewhere between the clause and the single word. One is the adjective with "res." "Res" (except in the sense of property) has in itself, when combined with an adjective, practically no meaning. It is a device whereby an adjective is enabled to carry the meaning of a noun; e. g., Ru. 95: ubi rem divinam se facturum dixerat; Cic. ad Fam. III, 8, 9: de rebus urbanis quod me certiores fecisti; and passim. This use of "res" is a convenient device, and capable of wide application. The other device is that of the indefinite expressions which are frequently agglutinated into one word, and which are of comparatively limited application; e. g., Ru. 561: nescioquem metuentes miserae; ibid. 83/4: pro di immortales, tempestatem quouismodi / Neptunus nobis nocte hac misit proxuma; ibid. 321: cum istiusmodi virtutibus operisque natus qui si[e]t. The last expressions are meaningless unless the reference is clear, and "nescioquis," which does not require such reference, is in itself totally indefinite; all these compounds differ from the "res" with adjective expressions in that the latter can by themselves convey a tolerably precise meaning. Cf. Ru. 967: ego illum novi quois nunc est, tu illum quois antehac fuit, which illustrates the fact that any degree of precision destroys the indefinite construction. In Ru. 83 "quouismodi" is merely emphatic, "*what a storm!*"

New words are required to define a new concept or combination of concepts; or to define a familiar concept, because the

leicht einen verschiedenen begrifflichen Inhalt—um wieviel leichter also einen besonderen Stimmungsgehalt, einen komischen oder verächtlichen Nebensinn. Auch in einzelnen Familien bildet sich gar leicht eine besondere Sprache heraus, und der in diesen Kreis tretende Fremde hat sich erst dem besonderen Gefühlston mancher Ausdrücke anzubequemen, ehe er die andern völlig versteht oder von ihnen verstanden wird. Endlich könnte man sogar sagen, dass bei der einzelnen Person sich gewisse Wörter mit unwillkürlichen und unwiderruflichen Begleitgefühlen verketteten.—Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, p. 124.

term previously used has become inadequate on account of a shift of meaning. Ru. 508/9: *scelestiorem cenam cenavi tuam/quam quae Thyestae* † quondam antepositast et Tereo; the concept that is here compared with that of the dinner is complicated by reason of the fact that it would require a dvandva compound for univerbal expression. There seems no adjective corresponding to Tereus, and in Plautus' time none corresponding to Thyestes. "Thyesteus" occurs in classical Latin; and Ovid, P. IV, 6, 47, *utque Thyesteae redeant si tempora mensae*, is a good example to contrast with Ru. 508/9. Sometimes the new term is a mere agglutination, as in the case of preposition with verb or adjective. On account of the idea of nearness associated with "sub" in such phrases as "sub montem," compounds with sub are freely formed; e. g., Ru. 423: *sub-volturium*—*illud quidem subaquilum volui dicere*. "Aquilus" is itself defined Paul. Fest. 22: *aquilus color est fuscus et sub-niger*.<sup>15</sup> On page 1773 alone of Harper's Lexicon twenty-two compounds of sub appear as *ὑπαξ λεγόμενα*. Other compounds are agglutinative determinative, which, however, did not thrive in Latin. Good examples are the dependent adjective compounds in the Attis of Catullus; *hederigera*, 23: *ubi capita maenades vi iaciunt hederigerae*; *silvicultrix* and *nemorivagus*, 72: *ubi cerva silvicultrix*, *ubi aper nemorivagus*; and the possessive *properipes*, 34: *rapidum ducem secuntur Gallae properipedem*. Cf. Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar 1265, 1293 ff. Three of these compounds are starred in Harper's Lexicon. These *ὑπαξ λεγόμενα*, so far as we can judge from the evidence, represent the formation of a new word, or rather its emergence into literature; but the concepts which they represented were not of sufficient importance to require a separate expression, or some other word was more satisfactory to the public. "Perhiberi" in the sense of "dici" in the comedians is an instance of arrested development.

"Ambulator" appears first in Cato, "ambulatix" appears nowhere else. R. R. 5, 2: *vilicus ne sit ambulator*; *ibid.* 143, 1: *uxor vilici ad cenam nequo eat, neve ambulatix siet*. The word in either gender denotes a specific sort of idler; it is probable

<sup>15</sup>So that a comparison by diminution could be established: *niger*, *aquilus*, *subniger*.

that no one else felt the need of the definition of this particular kind of idler, as there are adjectives in use, and as the distinction from other kinds of idleness is not very clear-cut. "Abactor" occurs first in literature in Apuleius, *Met.* VII, 26: *abactorem indubitatum, cruentumque percussorem*; possibly the use of the word here is due to the desire for a formal hendiadys. It is defined by Isidore, *Orig.* 10, 14: *est fur iumentorum et pecorum quem vulgo abigeum vocant*. There is no etymological reason why "abactor" should be "fur"; it might etymologically and logically quite as well mean "defensor," i. e., "abactor hostium." The term is defined with great precision by the jurist Paulus Sententiarius, *Sent.* 5, 18, 1: *abactores (abegectores) sunt qui unum equum vel duas equas totidemque boves (oves) vel capras decem porcos quinque abegerint*. This definition furnishes an example of the precision necessary in technical vocabulary. "Abigeus" also comes in for a technical definition; Ulpian, *Dig.* 42, 14, 1, 1 (Goetz, *Archiv*, I (1884) 561): *abigei autem proprie hi habentur qui pecora ex pascuis vel ex armentis subtrahunt, et quodammodo deprædantur, et abigendi studium quasi artem exercent, equos de gregibus vel boves de armentis abducentes. Ceterum si quis bovem aberrantem vel equos in solitudine relictos abduxerit, non est abigeus sed fur potius*. The present participle appears first in Pliny; the singular *N. H.* 8, 142: *canem . . . volucres ac feras abigentem*; the plural *ibid.* 8, 91: *delphini abigentes eos (sc. crocodilos) prædam*. The verb "cancellare" appears first in Columella, *R. R.* IV, 2: *haec (sc. vitis) autem quæ toto est prostrata corpore cum inferius solum quasi cancellavit atque irretivit, cratem facit*. The vine makes a lattice-work on the ground. Thence the term was applied to the act of striking out with the mark "x"; thence to the act of annulling, in which latter significations it survives in English. The verb when first used marked a concept of sufficient importance and frequency to require separate definition in ordinary speech.

The introduction of a new science or the development of a science which is not new requires new terms. Quintilian furnishes many examples of the adaptation of terms, sometimes taken bodily from Greek, sometimes translated; *Inst. Orat.* IX, 4, 22: *at illa connexa series tres habet formas: incisa, quæ κόμματα dicuntur, membra, quæ κῶλα, περίοδον quæ est vel am-*

bitus, vel circumductum, vel continuatio vel conclusio; ibid. 3, 81: contrapositum, autem, vel, ut quidam vocant, contentio (*ἀντίθετον* dicitur) non uno fit modo; VIII, 3, 50: sicut *ταυτολογία* id est eiusdem verbi aut sermonis iteratio; ibid. 53: vitanda *μακρολογία* id est longior quam oportet sermo . . . est et *πλεονασμός* vitium, cum supervacuis verbis oratio oneratur; ibid. 55: est etiam quae *περιεργία* vocatur, supervacua, ut sic dixerim, operositas. Quintilian adopts *κακόζηλον* as a Latin word, ibid. 58: est autem omne *κακόζηλον* utique falsum, etiamsi non omne falsum *κακόζηλον*. Cacozelon vero est quod dicitur aliter quam se natura habet et quam oportet, et quam sat est; as Lucretius adopts "homoeomeria" because there is no Latin word for it: De Rerum Nat. I, 830/2, nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian / quam Grai memorant, nec nostra dicere lingua / concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas.

This paper is merely a suggestion as to some of the main principles that govern the linguistic expression of concepts. If the holophrastic condition of very primitive speech is assumed,<sup>16</sup> the first necessity for the convenient interchange of ideas, the differentiation of the holophrase into its component parts, had been carried very far when the first Latin now extant appears, though the analysis of the verb has been carried farther. Single words, the separate counters of speech, were available to represent most ordinary things and ideas with facility. The process of recombination to represent more concisely new or more abstract concepts was going on all through the literary period. The greater concreteness of many Latin expressions may be an evidence of this fact; e. g., *res gestae*, qui in re publica versantur, and other periphrases used in Latin where in English or Greek an abstract term would be employed, and the borrowing of philosophical and technical terms so largely from the Greek. The univocal expression of concepts not previously so expressed was being developed as at present and the process must continue so long as language is a vehicle of thought. Linguistic develop-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, Erster Band, Zweiter Teil, pp. 633-4; and also p. 635: Als eine Ausdrucksbewegung, was sie (i. e., die Sprache) auf allen ihren Entwicklungsstufen bleibt, geht sie vollkommen kontinuierlich aus der Gesamtheit der Ausdrucksbewegungen hervor, die das animalische Leben überhaupt kennzeichnen.



ment corresponds not inaptly to the Spencerian formula; it is a change from an indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity, to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity.

So far the problem is relatively simple, but a number of questions remain to be asked. There are elements of concepts apparently frequent in occurrence, simple, and not detailed, that do not seem to lend themselves readily to absorption into a univocal expression. To select two, the ideas of alternation and proximity ("almostness" would convey the second idea better): ad Fam. III, 6, 5, *quid ageres aut ubi te visurus essem*, raises the question of alternation; Pl. Capt. 20, *quia quasi una aetas erat*, or Pliny Ep. VII, 20, 3, *propemodum aequales*, that of proximity. It is interesting to note that Harper's *Lexicon* gives only three examples of "*paeninsula*."<sup>17</sup> Or, to take another example in Latin, why are verbs in Latin not compounded with the negative prefix "*in*"?<sup>18</sup> These questions and others of a similar nature cannot be answered here. They call for a separate investigation, and may be insoluble. They lead to metaphysics, while what has been done in this paper does not transgress the limits of linguistic psychology. Nevertheless, these questions, whether insoluble or not, are insistent. Grammarians avoid metaphysics as far as possible, and they do well. The reaction against the illegitimate intrusion of *a priori* metaphysical concepts that resulted in logical categories to which speech was made to conform has cleared the ground from useless lumber and made a science of language possible; but when inductive study has built up this science there still remains the question of its relation to metaphysics. It may be that the consideration of such problems as here suggested would do something toward establishing the boundaries of grammar and metaphysics; for ultimately grammar, as well as all other sciences, must come to an understanding with philosophy.

EDWARD W. NICHOLS.

DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Merrill's note to Catullus, 31, 1.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Lindsay, L. L., p. 363.

#### IV.—TWO PASSAGES IN PINDAR.

##### (a) Olympians II 58-62

ὁ μὲν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαυδαμένος  
φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν  
καιρόν, βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν,  
ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον  
ἀνδρὶ φέγγος.

The word ἀγροτέραν is a good example of a familiar problem—how far should the united authority of manuscript and scholiast be considered as decisive? Professor Gildersleeve's note on the passage is, as usual, highly judicious—"According to the majority of interpreters this means 'rousing a deep, and eager yearning for achievement' 'putting into the heart of man a deep and eager mood.' So the scholiast; συνετὴν ἔχων τὴν φροντίδα πρὸς τὸ ἀγρεύειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ. . . But diversity of opinion may be pardoned."

Two unsatisfactory emendations, ἀβροτέραν ἀκροτέραν, at least testify to a reluctance to accept the scholiast's gloss, and it must be allowed that his interpretation does not harmonize either with the usual meaning or the derivation of ἀγρότερος, which is formed directly from ἀγρός as ὀρέστερος is from ὄρος. Although Agrotera is one of the ritual names of Artemis, the goddess of the country and the chase, ἀγροτέρα μέριμνα can hardly bear any other meaning than 'cura agrestis,' 'rustic occupation,' 'care of the fields.' If this be granted, it follows that in spite of manuscript and scholiast some change in our text is needed. The rhythm of the latter part of the sentence suggests that ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος is in antithesis to ἐτυμώτατον φέγγος, the dazzling glare of the meteor—for the phrase is probably a reminiscence of Homer Iliad 13. 244—as contrasted with the steady light of the sun. It may be that the comma should come after μέριμναν and ἀγροτέροις be read 'the idle careless drones,' as a pendant to ἀνδρὶ, the hero prince of whom Pindar is thinking.

Wealth when adorned with righteous deeds  
Of this and that occasion brings,  
But deep within the heart it leads  
To subtle questionings;  
For idle folk a meteor gleaming bright,  
To hero souls life's truest light."

## (b) Pythians I 38-39

νιφόεσσ' Αἴτνα πάνετες  
χιόνος ὀξείας τιθήνα.

In all the great gallery of the First Pythian there is no more wonderful picture than this, although the critics have paid it scant attention. Etna like Atlas, that other pillar of the sky, is half-mountain half-mortal; but while Atlas is an old man bent with years,—

tum flumina mento

praecipitant senis et glacie riget horrida barba—

Etna is a young nursing mother, her breasts rising free to heaven, and from the upper heights the white snow comes running down even as the white milk wells from the breast of a living τιθήνη, not for the space of some months but for all the year. The vision that Pindar saw is scarcely brought home to English readers in our translations. Sandys gives—‘snow-clad Etna who nurseth her keen frost for the live-long year’; Myers—‘snowy Etna nursing the whole year’s length her dazzling snow’—which is to confuse τιθήνη with τροφός, as though a Frenchman were to identify his ‘nourrice’ with his ‘bonne.’ The vital words are χιόνος ὀξείας τιθήνα, and they will repay careful examination. χιόνος is a descriptive, not a possessive genitive—descriptive also the other genitives γενέσεως, βίου κ. τ. λ. cited under the metaphorical uses of τιθήνα in L. and S.—and χιόνος τιθήνα is the same sort of oxymoron as Horace’s ‘arida nutrix,’ χιόνος being substituted for γάλακτος as arida is substituted for umida. The oxymoron derives fresh force from the adjective. ὀξεία χιών cannot possibly mean ‘dazzling snow,’ for if ὀξύς is to mean ‘bright,’ it must be used with a noun of vision, like our ‘sharp glance.’ ὀξύς is ‘sharp to the touch’ and ‘sharp to the taste,’ and in both senses it is applicable to χιών, which of course is snow, not ‘frost,’ snow as it lies and melts on the ground as opposed to νιφάς the drifting snow-flake. But in its second sense ὀξεία here is peculiarly appropriate, for sharp to the taste, bitter, *acerbus* is exactly the opposite of the natural epithet of milk, soft to the taste, sweet, *blandus*, and so the adjective carries on the figure that the noun begins: we have χιόνος ὀξείας instead of the natural γάλακτος γλυκέος.

White-flaked Etna on whose crest  
All the long year through  
Streameth from each lifted breast  
Bitter milk of snow.

F. A. WRIGHT.

## V.—THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME *CILICIA*.

The first certain appearance of the name *Cilicia* is in the cuneiform inscriptions of Tiglathpileser III (not IV), where *Hilakku* refers to the mountainous district later occupied by the Isaurians<sup>1</sup> and the southwestern corner of Cappadocia, a connotation which the word still possessed in classical times, though the modern definition was already coming into use. In the Hittite texts of the second millennium, southeastern Cilicia is called *Arzawa*, Babylonian *Ursu*, a name which survived in classical *Rhosus* (not *Arsus*<sup>2</sup>) and modern *Arsus*. Some centuries later, we find that this district is called in the Assyrian and Aramean inscriptions, as well as in the Old Testament by the name *Quweh* (*Que*, *Qwh*).

On Persian coins of Cilicia we find usually the form  $\text{𐎧𐎵}$ , corresponding to the Assyrian, but on coins of the satrap Pharnabazus the orthography  $\text{𐎧𐎶}$  occurs instead. The latter spelling cannot be explained by the Greek *Κιλικία*, but both evidently have a common source, older than the dissimilated form *Hlk*, though both forms may have existed side by side for many centuries. There is, therefore, no phonetic objection to the identification of the *Kl(r)kš*, who appear among the Anatolian peoples who

<sup>1</sup>The antiquity of the name Isaurian is confirmed by the recent discovery in the Boghaz-keui collections of the classical *Garsaura*, northwest of Tyana, as *Kursaura*, in a text purporting to describe events of the thirtieth century B.C. The element *saur* thus belongs to the primitive Cappadocian language, probably the prefixing Eteo-Hittite (a better term than Proto-Hittite) language described by Forrer.

<sup>2</sup>This "classical" form has been invented by Professor Sayce; see *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, VI, 296. The relation between the various writings *Ursu*, *Uršu*, and *Arzawa* has been pointed out by the writer in *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, VII, 80 f., unfortunately without noting Sayce's blunder. Another, much more portentous mistake of the same kind (*loc. cit.*) is Sayce's statement that *Yarmuti* is "classical" *Armuthia*. The source of this is Tompkins, *Trans. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, IX, 242, ad 218 (of the Tuthmosis list): "Mauti. Perhaps the Yari-muta of the Tel el-Amarna tablets, now (I think) *Armūthia*, south of Killis." This is the modern village of *Armūdja*, a hamlet some three miles south of Killis, not on the coast at all, but in the heart of Syria, and with no known classical background.

threatened Egypt in the thirteenth century, with the Cilicians; the ending *š* is, as is well-known, a gentilic ending (cf. *Jour. Pal. Orient. Soc.* I, 57, n. 2). On the other hand, we must now distinguish between the *Klkš*-Cilicians and the Teucrian Ger-githes, who appear on the Egean coast of Asia Minor and in Cyprus, though the latter may well be identical with the Gir-gashites of Canaan.

Attention may be called, in this connection, to the name *Halikbat*, the archaic designation of the district later known as *Melid*, Greek *Melitene*, which extended, like *Katmuh* or *Kutmuh* (Commagene) on both sides of the Euphrates. The name is written *Hanigalbat* (formerly read *Hanirabbat*), *Haligalbat[û]* (Scheil, *Délégation en Perse*, II, 95 f.) and *Hanakalbat*. The native form, in the text of the Mitannian Agabtaḥa, was *Hali-g(k)albat*; *Hanigalbat* and *Hanakalbat* are the Babylonian forms, which unquestionably originated in the dissimilation of the first *l*. Schroeder's artificial suggestion, *Orient. Lit.*, 1918, 175, that *LI* had a "*Hanigalbatean*" reading *ana* is impossible, as well as wholly gratuitous. It is barely possible that the correct form, *Halikalbat*, should be analyzed as *Halik-albat*, and combined with *Kilik-Hilak*, Cilicia. However, one must not forget the fate of an older hypothesis of this type, combining *Hanigalbat*, read *Hanirabbat*, with *Hana* = 'Anah, as "Great Hana."

W. F. ALBRIGHT.

AMERICAN SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH,  
JERUSALEM, PALESTINE.



## VI.—IMPRISONED ENGLISH AUTHORS AND THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY OF BOETHIUS.

Sir Thomas More, best known perhaps as the author of *Utopia*, cherished the teachings of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, and was cheered by them while awaiting death in the Tower of London.<sup>1</sup> In fact, he is said to have had the *Consolation* with him during his imprisonment.<sup>2</sup> That he wrote in imitation of it at that time we know through his work entitled, *A Dialogue of Coumfort agaynst Tribulacion*.<sup>3</sup> Convincing evidence of More's familiarity with the *Consolation of Philosophy* is contained in Holbein's picture, *The More Family Group*. In the study in Indian ink; now in the Basel Gallery, More's daughter, Margaret, holds the *Consolation of Philosophy* in her hand; but in the finished painting now at Nostell Priory the composition is somewhat altered. Arthur B. Chamberlain in describing these changes says: 'The various accessories in the room have also been to some extent changed. . . . The titles of the books are given in most cases. Thus Margaret Roper holds open Seneca's *Oedipus* at the chorus in Act IV, Elizabeth Dancey has Seneca's *Epistles* under her arm, while Boetius de *Consolatione Philosophiae* is on the sideboard.'<sup>4</sup> When we remember that Holbein was lodged at Sir Thomas More's house during many years of his sojourn in England we have good reason for accepting his composition as significant.

Among other English authors who, while imprisoned, drew comfort from the *Consolation* are John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, who sent an imitation of it to his royal and captive mistress, Mary, Queen of Scots, in 1572; and King James the First of Scotland who, as he himself tells us, gained inspiration for his greatest work, *The Kingis Quair*, through reading the *Consolation of Boethius* as he lay in bed unable to rest.

Concerning the *Consolation of Philosophy* and King James

<sup>1</sup> Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, 3, 514.

<sup>2</sup> Sedgefield, *King Alfred's Version of the Consolation of Boethius*, Introduction, p. xvii.

<sup>3</sup> *Everyman's Library*, No. 461.

<sup>4</sup> Hans Holbein the Younger, 1, 296.

the First, Washington Irving, in his *A Royal Poet*, says: 'From the high eulogism in which he (King James) indulges, it is evident that this was one of his favorite volumes while in prison: and indeed it is an admirable text-book for meditation under adversity. It is the legacy of a noble and enduring spirit, purified by sorrow and suffering, bequeathing to its successors in calamity the maxims of sweet morality and the trains of eloquent but simple reasoning, by which it was enabled to bear up against the various ills of life. It is a talisman, which the unfortunate may treasure up in his bosom, or, like the good King James, lay upon his nightly pillow.'

GUY BAYLEY DOLSON.

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA.

## VII.—THE DERIVATIVES OF SANSKRIT *ēka*.

Hindi has *ēk* (one) corresponding to Sanskrit *ēka*, and similar *k*-forms appear in the other Aryan tongues of India. Bloch assumes that the Prākṛit form, with *kk*, was borrowed from Sanskrit after *g* had developed from *k* between vowels, so that the *k* was necessarily reproduced as *kk*.<sup>1</sup> It seems unlikely, however, that such a word could be anything but popular in form. Modern Provencal and Walloon have *n*, between vowels, representing Latin *ūnus* and *ūna*.<sup>2</sup> Likewise *ēka* developed a stressless form *ka*. Here the *k*, being initial, was not subject to change; and its influence caused *k* to be kept or restored in the stressed derivative of *ēka*. The form *ka* is not entirely conjectural: it is contained in Hindi *kaēk*, Marāṭi *kaik* (much) < *ēka-ēka*, and in Kashmīri *kāh* (eleven), equivalent to Hindi *igārah*, Marāṭi *akrā* < *ēkādaṣa*. From *igārah* and similar forms in the related languages, it is clear that the initial vowel was sometimes dropped after *ēka* had changed to *\*ēga*, and then partially restored under the influence of the stressed form. The relation of Hindi *gyārah* and *igārah* seems to resemble that of Portuguese *aipo*, *limpo*, *ruivo*, and Spanish *apio*, *limpio*, *rubio*; but *gyārah* might also be a composite of *\*gārah* and a form corresponding to Sindi *yārahā*, derived from Prākṛit *ēāraha* (with a normal loss of intervocalic *g* < *k*). In Prākṛit *eggāraha* the *gg* came from a variant with initial *g*, probably *\*gāraha* for older *\*gādasa*, after simple occlusives between vowels had changed to fricatives or disappeared.

EDWIN H. TUTTLE.

NORTH HAVEN, CONN.

<sup>1</sup> Bloch, *Formation de la langue marathe*, §§ 94, 213 (Paris, 1915).

<sup>2</sup> Koschwitz, *Grammaire de la langue des félibres*, § 24 (Greifswald, 1894); Feller, *Orthographe wallonne*, p. 42 (Liège, 1905).

## REPORTS.

RIVISTA DI FILOLOGIA, Vol. XLIX (1921).

Pp. 1-6. Apicio. Remigio Sabbadini. The Vatican codex of Apicius was discovered by Enoch of Ascoli in the monastery of Fulda, and brought by him to Italy. Poggio had seen it at Fulda in 1417. Pomponio Leto had a copy of Apicius, and so had Bartolomeo Sacchi ('Il Platina'), who composed an imitation of this treatise as early as 1475. Codex E was also brought to Italy in the fifteenth century. It was owned by Perotto, and used by Poliziano.

Pp. 7-32. Il coro delle *Coefore*. G. Attilio Piovano. The first instalment of a detailed analysis of the rôle of the Chorus in Aeschylus' *Choephoroe*, and the development of its sentiments in the three parts of the play (22-648, 649-970; 971-1074).

Pp. 33-41. Studi sull'accento greco e latino. IX. Turbamenti nei fenomeni di apofonia latina. Massimo Lenchantin De Gubernatis. A study of a list of Latin words which appear to have resisted the usual tendency to weaken an unaccented short vowel within a word. These exceptional forms are mainly due to the influence of the other Italian dialects.

Pp. 42-56. Stichomythia. Carlo Oreste Zuretti. A study of stichomythia in Greek tragedy, the extent of its use, and the various groupings of lines employed by each poet. In Aeschylus it amounts to 6% of his lines; in Sophocles, to 7%; in Euripides, to 12%.

Pp. 57-78. Come ho tradotto Catullo. Ettore Stampini. Translations into Italian verse of Catullus, 17, 25, 30, 34, 63, 65, 68<sup>a</sup>, 73, 76, with discussion of the most appropriate metres.

Pp. 79-97. La satira IX di Giovenale nella tradizione della cultura sino alla fine del medio evo. Santi Consoli. An interesting array of quotations from the ninth satire of Juvenal, from Priscian to Petrarch, especially in Aldhelm, John of Salisbury, Peter of Blois, Giraldus Cambrensis, and Vincent of Beauvais. The passages quoted are: 1-5, 13-15, 18-20, 31-33, 50-53, 58-60, 84-85, 88-92, 101-108, 109-112, 118-121, 124, 125-129, 130-134, 140-144.

Pp. 98-99. Ancora sull' "orma di piè mortale." See vol. XLVIII 390-91 and 467-74. C. O. Zuretti still insists that Manzoni's expression may have been derived from Euripides, perhaps through translations by Goethe and Schiller. Paolo Bellezza points out that two of Manzoni's Italian commentators

have defended the phrase, and quoted both biblical and classical parallels. (Why not quote parallels even from Latin prose? Cp. Curtius Rufus, 4, 9, 18, cum modo saxa lubrica vestigium fallerent, modo rapidior unda subduceret; Pliny, Epp. 2, 1, 5, fallente vestigio.)

Pp. 100-36. Reviews and book notices: Walters and Conway, Livy, VI-X; G. C. Fiske, Lucilius and Horace: G. Pasquali, Orazio Lirico; etc.

Pp. 137-56. Reports of classical periodicals.

Pp. 157-60. List of new books received.

Pp. 161-94. Il coro nelle tragedie di Seneca. Umberto Moricca. The choruses of Seneca have a much closer relation to the action of his dramas than 'i critici tedeschi' have recognized.

Pp. 195-214. Il coro delle *Coefore*. G. Attilio Piovano. Concluded from p. 32.

Pp. 215-27. Critica e lingua della 'Vita Alexandri Magni' o 'Historia de preliis' di Leo archipresbyter secondo la recensione del cod. Bambergensis. Francesco Stabile.

Pp. 228-29. Ovidio Metamorfosi XV 805-6. Domenico Bassi. Ovid has changed the story of Aphrodite's rescue of Aeneas, Iliad, V 314-17.

Pp. 230-52. Neottolemo e Orazio. Paolo Fossataro. A comparison of Horace's *Ars Poetica* with the poetical theories of Neoptolemus. The article is based on Christian Jensen's *Neoptolemos und Horaz*, Berlin, 1919.

Pp. 253-82. Reviews and book notices.

Pp. 283-300. Reports of classical periodicals.

Pp. 301-304. List of new books received.

Pp. 305-35. Vitruvio e la fortuna del suo trattato nel mondo antico. Francesco Pellati. It is practically certain that Vitruvius was a contemporary of Augustus, and his *De Architectura* was probably composed between 27 and 23 B. C. He is mentioned three times by the elder Pliny, and once by Frontinus. In the first half of the third century Cetus Faventinus wrote an epitome of a portion of his treatise; this epitome was used by Gargilius Martialis, about the middle of the third century, and, through Martialis, it served as one of the sources of Palladius, about 370. Vitruvius is mentioned also by Servius, in the fourth century, and by Sidonius Apollinaris, in the fifth; but by that time he was merely a great name, and his treatise had very little influence on the architecture of that day.



Pp. 336-39. *Costruzione paratattica appositiva in Cato?* Francesco Stabile. Examination of five passages in Cato's *De Agri Cultura* in which Kühner sees 'paratactic apposition.' These may all be explained in some other way.

Pp. 340-44. *Papiro Ercolanese 873*. Domenico Bassi. Text of ten fragments of Philodemus based on a fresh study of the papyrus.

Pp. 345-74. Reviews and book notices: J. Marouzeau, *La Linguistique*; Carl Robert, *Die griechische Heldensage*, I-II; F. Poulsen, *Delphi*, translated by G. C. Richards; J. T. Sheppard, *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles*; J. T. Allen, *The Greek Theatre of the Fifth Century before Christ*; etc.

Pp. 375-79. Obituary notices of Giovanni Ferrara and Carlo Giambelli.

Pp. 380-97. Reports of classical periodicals.

Pp. 398-400. List of new books received.

Pp. 401-30. *Gallico e Latino*. Benvenuto Terracini. A review of Georges Dottin's *La langue gauloise*, Paris, 1920. Pp. 426-30 contain a list of 'Gallic' words which Dottin has not considered.

Pp. 431-34. *La canizie precoce di Virgilio e le biografie virgiliane note al Petrarca*. Vincenzo Ussani. Petrarch's statement that Virgil was prematurely gray should be compared with an ancient interpretation of *Ecl.* i. 28, mentioned by Servius. In his own copy of Virgil he entered Servius' note on *Aen.* vi. 809: "*hic etiam canus fuit a prima aetate.*" The statement, in the Basel ed. of the *Secretum*, 1649, that Virgil was XXXII when he wrote the *Eclogues* is due to confusion of the numeral. The *Cod. Laur.* has XXVI; the *Reggio* ed. of 1501 has XXVII; the *Venice* ed. of 1503 has XXXII (by mistake for XXVII).

Pp. 435-55. *Studi Anneani*. Luigi Castiglioni. Textual notes on Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones*.

Pp. 456-67. *Reminiscenze virgiliane nelle prose di L. Anneo Seneca*. Santi Consoli.

P. 468. *Epigrammata*. Ettore Stampini.

Pp. 469-91. Reviews and book notices: K. F. Smith, *Martial the Epigrammatist*; O. Hamelin, *Le système d'Aristote*; F. G. Kenyon, *Aristotelis Atheniensium Respublica*, Oxford, 1920; etc.

Pp. 492-508. Reports of classical periodicals.

Pp. 509-12. List of new books received.

W. P. MUSTARD.

## GLOTTA. Volume XI (1920-1).

Pp. 1-28. A. Debrunner, Das hellenistische Nebensatziterativ-präteritum mit *ἄν*. Hellenistic use of past indic. with *ἄν* in iterative sense is limited to subordinate clauses. It is not connected historically with the superficially similar classical construction (ref. to Gildersleeve, *Syntax*, I, § 431), which is limited to principal clauses. It is a Hellenistic substitute for the classical optative without *ἄν* as a preterite to a present with subjunctive and *ἄν*; ἔλεγεν ὁ τι *ἄν* (ὄταν etc.) ἐβούλετο or ἐβουλήθη, for ὁ τι βούλοιτο. Addenda on the meaning of *ἄν*, and on further late Greek extensions of *ἄν* with indicative in subordinate clauses.

Pp. 29-50. F. H. v. Helle, Problem der lateinischen Silbentrennung. Prescriptions of Latin grammarians on division of syllables (Probus to Alcuin). Need for correction of school rules, especially the rule that any consonant-combination which can begin a Greek or Latin word should not be divided. Only mute plus liquid are undivided between vowels. With reference to Walter Dennison's "Syllabification in Latin inscriptions" (CP I): "Seine Ergebnisse decken alle unsere Regeln."

Pp. 51-75. F. Slotty, Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Vulgärlateins. I. Der sprachliche Ausdruck für die drei Dimensionen. Historical study of methods of expressing measurement (length, breadth, height, depth), traced from Indo-European thru Latin (literary and popular) to the Romance languages.—II. Der Typus Châlons-sur-Marne im Lateinischen. The use of *super*, *supra* (instead of the usual *ad*, *apud*) to denote vicinity to rivers and the like is traced to the first century B. C.; it is regarded as characteristic of popular Latin; hence the Romance languages use such expressions as French *sur*, Italian *sopra*.

Pp. 75-79. E. Schwyzer, Kleine Bemerkungen zu griechischen Dialektinschriften. Seven brief notes. 5. *αυεθε* IG. VII. 3682 interpreted as containing \**εθη* = Sanskrit *ádhāt*, root-aorist to *τίθημι*.

Pp. 79-81. E. Kieckers, Zur Satzapposition. Such expressions as (Sallust) *Eumienem . . . prodidere Antiocho, mercedem scelerum* are derived from old independent noun-sentences drawn into dependence; the apposition was originally nominative (Tacitus Ann. 3. 27 *compositae duodecim tabulae, finis aequi iuris*).

Pp. 81-84. W. Kroll, Zur Satzapposition. Opposes Kieckers's view; believes the "Satzapposition" developed out of what was originally a word-apposition, which came to be felt loosely as in apposition to the idea of the whole sentence.

Pp. 85-94. R. Munz, Ueber *γλωττα* und *διάλεκτος* und über ein posidonianisches Fragment bei Strabo. Ein sprachwissen-

schaftlich-philologischer Exkurs zu Posidonius bei Strabo C 176 über dialektische Verschiedenheiten bei den Galliern.

Pp. 94-144. Literaturbericht für das Jahr 1917. Greek, by P. Kretschmer; Italic languages and Latin Grammar, by F. Hartmann; (Latin) Syntax, by W. Kroll.

Pp. 145-175. H. Blase, Zum Konjunktiv im Lateinischen. 2. Der Konjunktiv im bedingenden Satze. Subjunctive in conditional sentences is not derived from expressions of wish.

Pp. 175-179. G. N. Hatzidakis, Griechische Miscellen. I. ἀβέλτερος (comparative to \*ἄβελτος). II. ζαρώνω = verschrumpfen, zusammenziehen (from ὀζάριον: ὄζος). III. κονάκι—κονεύω. IV. Zum Verständnis einiger Komposita.

Pp. 179-183. E. Kieckers, Zum Schaltensatz im späteren Griechisch. Greater freedom in late Greek in use of the parenthetized verbs of saying (φημί, εἶπον etc.).

P. 183. E. Kieckers, Zum ὅτι recitativum. An instance from a papyrus (2-3 Cent. A. D.).

Pp. 183-184. E. Kieckers, Zu *inquit*, φησὶν 'heisst es.' This use of verb of saying with subject indefinite is derived from statements of legal or other prescriptions; a word like *lex* or the like is at first understood as subject.

Pp. 185-192. M. Leumann, Lateinische Etymologien und Bedeutungen. *anxia*, *axitia* und *axitiosus*.—*fastibalus*, *fundibalus*, *-bulum*, *-bulator*.—*miscellus*, originally contraction of \**minuscellus*, \**minscellus*, from *minusculus*; it occurs first in Cato and Varro as technical term of viniculture and means (according to Leumann) "very small" (vines or grapes); later it was connected with *misceo* by popular etymology.

Pp. 192-194. M. Leumann, Part. perf. pass. mit *fui* im späteren Latein. *fuera*m, *fuisse*m, *fuero*, *fuisse* with part. (instead of *eram* etc.) used in late Latin regularly in subordinate clauses, while *eram* etc. remain usual in principal clauses.

P. 195. M. Leumann, *egressum iri* (for *egressurum esse*).—Zum späten griech. *ἦν*. (Retained in Modern Greek *ἦρα* [*ivra*].)

Pp. 195-198. P. Kretschmer, Ares. The name means "destroyer" and particularly "avenger"; hence the cult of this god is of right connected with the Areopagus.

Pp. 198-203. F. Hartmann, Nachtrag zu *Germanus* (Glotta 9. 1 ff.). Reply to Norden's criticism of the author's views on the meaning of *Germanus*, with especial reference to passages of Tacitus and Strabo.

Pp. 203-204. E. Schwyzer, Nachtrag zu S. 76 f.

Pp. 204-205. R. Methner, Zu dem Aufsatz von H. Blase "Zum Konjunktiv im Lateinischen," Glotta 10, S. 30 ff. Note on the "jussive (subjunctive) of the past."

Pp. 205-211. Th. Grienberger, Oskisches. 3. Die Berier-Inschriften. Notes on three Oscan inscriptions published by Weege, Bonner Jahrbücher, Heft 118, pp. 275-279.

Pp. 211-217. M. Hammarström, Griechisch-etruskische Wortgleichungen. Some etymological comparisons of Greek words, supposed to have been taken from pre-Hellenic non-Indo-European languages, with Etruscan words; the underlying assumption being that Etruscan came from the Aegean and was a relative of the languages from which the Greeks borrowed these words. Etr. *puia* "Ehefrau": *δπνίω* "heirate."—Etr. *netsvis* (an uncertain word conjectured by the author to mean something like "entrails"): *νηδύς*, *τὰ νήδνια*.—Lat. *fala* "column" (of Etr. origin): Hesychius *φάλαι* (?).—Etr. *eprōni*, an official title: *πρώτανς*, and perhaps from the same stem the name of Aphrodite.

Pp. 217-221. R. Thurneysen, Alt-Italisches. 1. Vulskisch. (A new interpretation of the bronze tablet of Velitrae, the "Hauptdenkmal der vulskischen Sprache.") 2. Marrukinisch. (On the inscription treated by Conway, 243, Skutsch, Glotta 3. 99, A. 1.)

Pp. 221-224. F. Vollmer, Noch einmal *ēst* und *ēst*. Further argument that the forms *es*, *est*, *estis*, *esse*, from *edo* "eat," have short *e*; reply to critics. (Cf. Glotta 1. 113 ff.)

Pp. 224-225. L. Spitzer, Ital. *camporeccio*, *campereccio* "ländlich." Criticism of M. Leumann's derivation, Glotta 9. 140.

Pp. 226-276. Literaturbericht für das Jahr 1918. By Kretschmer, Hartmann, and Kroll, as above, pp. 94-144.

Pp. 276-285. P. Kretschmer, Pelasger und Etrusker. Apropos of Hammarström's article, above, pp. 211-217. "Die Annahme einer Verwandtschaft der vorgriechischen Urbevölkerung mit den Etruskern liegt in der ganzen Richtung unserer Forschung." Other etymologies of the same sort; Etr. *huθ* "four," cf. Steph. Byz. *Υττηνία*: *Τετράπολις*; Etr. *eisar* "god(s)," *iepós*; Etr. *athanulus*, *atena*, etc., names of certain pieces of pottery used in religious ceremonies, perhaps connected with *Ἀθήνη* etc.

Pp. 286-288. J. Wackernagel, Zu Hesiod und Homer. Confirmation and proof of statements of W. referred to by P. Von der Mühl, Glotta 10. 145.

Pp. 288-291. Th. Kakridis, Die Bedeutung von *πολύτροπος* in der Odyssee. Originally "much-traveled," not "sly."

P. 291. A. Nehring, Lat. *saltus*. *saltus*, "Waldgebirge," perhaps related to *Wald*, from IE. *\*svaltos*.

Pp. 292-302. Indices, by E. Williger.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON.

## REVIEWS

*The Unity of Homer.* By JOHN A. SCOTT. Sather Classical Lectures. Volume I. The University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal., 1921. 275 pp. 8vo.

Dante has had his sexcentenary and Shakspeare his tercentenary, each marked by tokens of homage; Homer is debarred from centenaries. Yet in Homeric studies there have been epochal points whose anniversaries offer occasion for calling attention to the poet. The first volume of the Sather Classical Lectures thus happily appears approximately 125 years after the publication of Wolf's *Prolegomena*, and 50 years from the beginning of Schliemann's discoveries; and it not only brings homage to Homer but will, we venture to say, itself mark a new era in Homeric study. In the first place it is the greatest single contribution of the Far West—the Golden West whither the spirit of the Indo-European race has ever striven—to a re-valuation of the first and the unsurpassed Indo-European poet. In the battle of the Homerists SCOTT may be compared to General Pershing; the resources of the higher critics are beginning to show signs of exhaustion, for the tide is setting against the view of Homer which developed from the hypothesis of Wolf, and SCOTT has brought into action the forces of a young and vigorous, if somewhat inexperienced, national philology; and he has not confined his attack to a few minor points which offer a chance to weaken the enemy, but delivers a smashing blow upon the Hindenburg Line erected to defend that considerable poetic region which Teutonic critics and their followers had wrested from Homer.

*The Unity of Homer* is epoch-making because it is the challenge of a philologist of recognized ability to return to fair play in the study of Homer. Mure could be ignored; Gladstone could be set aside as a dilettante, and Lang as lacking in philological training; and poets and literary critics could be silenced because they deal with other phenomena than those which concern the classical scholar. But SCOTT is a philologist, trained by America's greatest Hellenist and teacher of scholars. His previous work on Homer has placed him among the world's leading Homerists. More than this, he began his researches believing in the results of higher criticism. In attempting to find new evidence wherewith to support the theory of Jebb, Leaf and Christ (p. 82), he found the facts pointing to a contrary conclusion—and he followed the facts, even though this led him to part with the Wolfians. This is the essentially new



and American contribution. His first lecture begins with the words, "The great fact of ancient Greece is the poetry of Homer." This is the keynote of the book and of Scott's method. Fair play, it says, and sound scholarship, too, require us to keep to the facts, and the greatest fact of all is the Homeric poetry itself.

During the past fifteen years or a little more, to judge by such incomplete bibliographies as are available, Professor Scott has published about 70 reviews, notes and articles dealing with Homer. In most of these he either lays bare what he has found reason to believe are fallacies or downright errors of higher critics, or else supports the Unitarian view by the results of his own minute and laborious research. These articles have been given out white-hot from the anvil. Professor Scott has not been the writer of books; it has been the facts, the evidence, that have absorbed his attention. The present work is hardly more than a brief, summing up the author's case for Homer. Like most series of lectures it suffers, when viewed as a treatise, by reason of its limitation to a certain number of chapters, each of a certain brevity, and by having been delivered to a general university audience, rather than addressed from the study to the narrower and more critical world of classical scholars.

The material on which the lectures are based is of three kinds. There are, first, the author's own previously published researches. Two of the eight chapters contain little more than this, viz., Chap. III (The Linguistic Arguments, the field in which Professor Scott has done his greatest work, and in which his main conclusions have not been successfully questioned) and Chap. VII (Hector, in which is presented the hypothesis, brilliantly conceived and alluring, but not generally recognized, that the Trojan hero is the creation of the poet and not a part of the tradition). The most important part of Chap. II (The Arguments of Wolf) is also taken from the author's previous studies. Secondly, the work of others is used, sparingly and chiefly to introduce or round out the author's own arguments, especially in Chapters IV and V (The Antiquities and Kindred Matters; The Contradictions). Professor Scott makes no claim to first-hand archaeological knowledge, but finds the most recent views of archaeologists on his side. Finally, there is the new material which was demanded or suggested by the need of presenting his views on Homer in a series of lectures. Chap. VI (The Individualization of Gods and Heroes, with a new and suggestive sketch of the character of Helen and of Odysseus), and Chap. VIII (The Iliad and the Odyssey, a concise statement of the structural features and of the tone of Homeric poetry) are largely new.

The same may be said of Chap. I (Homer Among the Ancient Greeks), for the new arguments were published at the time when the lectures were being prepared.

Recently the great Danish critic, Dr. Georg Brandes, speaking on 'Homeric Gods and Heroes' at the fiftieth anniversary of his first university lecture, remarked: "Save for a few uncritical people, of course, no one to-day believes that a single poet named Homer wrote either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*." Professor SCOTT's *credo* is as follows: Homer, a native of Smyrna, about 900 B. C., wrote both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* substantially as we have them. "Not only were no changes made in the text of Homer by Peisistratus, but no one before him or after him has succeeded in materially altering the text. No two persons could copy the same words in exactly the same way, lines from memory would slip in, others would drop out, but no passage so extended as ten verses has been lost from, or added to, the poetry of Homer. Also the language of the Vulgate is essentially the same as that in which the poems were originally composed" (p. 68).

Is Professor SCOTT one of the 'few uncritical people'? In a certain sense one may say, Yes. He is not the coldly impartial judge; rather, like Aristarchus, Petrarch, Schliemann, Sainte-Beuve, he has been 'enthused' by the spirit of Homer entering into him. His obsession (we use the word in a good sense) is the firm belief, the result of the most persistent and profound study of Homer and the literature about Homer, that the so-called higher criticism of the poet has no sure foundation of truth; that it is a kind of modern sophistic in its assumptions, its method and its results. The lust of battle has entered into the author as he has studied Homer more profoundly. 'Odi et amo' mark his pages. Sainte-Beuve used to rise and leave the room if one spoke slightly of Homer; in a similar case Professor SCOTT sees red, but stays—and fights.

But though he is advocate rather than judge, Professor SCOTT possesses three qualities of the sound critic. He insists continually that the defendant be given fair play: that his innocence be assumed until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that the evidence which is admitted against him is sound. For 2,500 years Homer was thought to be the author of both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (for the Chorizontes put forth a *paradox*, rather than an opinion); if one wishes to prove the contrary one must be as fair to this assumed authorship as one is to the unquestioned work of any known and great author, and the evidence presented to disprove Homer's authorship must be 'definite, unequivocal and reliable' (p. 15). This is the burden of the book. Again, the critic must be master

of the field in which he exercises his function: others may be more familiar with scholia and text tradition, but few men living know the Homeric poems—which is the main thing—as well as Professor SCOTT does. He has done perhaps more than any other one man to make the words of Dr. Brandes no longer true.

The fact is that Professor SCOTT approaches Homer as a disciple, rather than as a hunter bent on spoil; he starts with Homer instead of making the poet his objective. This is his third qualification as a critic, if one holds with Sainte-Beuve that the function of a critic is not to dictate but to understand. Pragmatically, at least, this is the best kind of criticism. An Atlantic essayist wrote, two generations ago (D. A. Wasson, *Atl. Mo.*, X, 1862, p. 63): "To make Homer alive to this age—what an expenditure of imagination, of pure feeling and penetration does it demand! Let the Homeric heart or genius die out of mankind, and from that moment the *Iliad* is but dissonance." Professor SCOTT's chief contribution is a mass of arguments, most of them original in essence or in detail, to prove that pure philology helps to keep the Homeric heart in mankind; he brings philology to the aid of poets and lovers of letters, instead of putting it as a stumbling-block in their path. But this makes of the author an extremist, and lays his work open to criticism. There is such a cramming of evidence and argument into the brief pages that it would be little short of a miracle if all should stand the test of time. But to point out an oversight here or a case of over-enthusiasm there—the book was apparently composed, as Professor Mackail says of the *Iliad*, at 'white-heat'—will not weaken its effect.

That it will convince any of the higher critics, we doubt. The lamentable feature of this quarrel between ancient and modern views of Homer is that there is no meeting of the minds; the opponents cannot agree upon the necessary underlying assumptions. Professor SCOTT has helped to clear the field. He lays down three principles: I. That *late* Greek statements, no matter how definite, and vague, random and fragmentary quotations from *early* Greek authors are not proof that the Greeks understood by 'Homer' the source of the great mass of cyclic poetry; and the fact that Xenophon and Aristotle accepted him as author of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and not of any cyclic poem, and do not even refer to such a theory of authorship, strongly indicates the contrary. II. That supposed inconsistencies of all kinds are either non-existent or greatly exaggerated; or may be made to prove the early or late date of almost any part of either poem, or may be paralleled in the known work of some other great author. III. That genius, as shown by the total effect of the 'massiveness'

of the two poems, cannot be composite. The author might have quoted Hennequin: *L'âme d'un grand artiste est celle qui peut frémir en un million de sensibilités individuelles et fait la joie et la douleur d'un peuple.*

This Brief for Homer is the manifesto of a new movement in the study of the poet. It says to the lover of great poetry: 'Your feeling that only one great poet could have composed Iliad and Odyssey has the support of sound philological research,' and to the philologist:—'I challenge you to make Homer, rather than the latest—or any—book on Homer, the base of your research; to study why Homer introduces certain features and motifs, and how he uses them, rather than to conjecture what may have been his sources—which must remain unknowable; to submit your minds to the spirit of his poetry, for this is the final test of any work of art; in other words, to unite philologicistic—as Croce calls modern philology—with the true philology or love of letters.'

Such a manifesto and challenge, based as it is on the profound and scholarly knowledge of Homer, need have no fear of essential ultimate success. But it implies an acceptance of the responsibilities of leadership. The battle for the rehabilitation of Homer has only just begun. While Professor SCOTT's previous work and the reasonableness of his position as summed up in these lectures give the rapidly increasing Unitarian party confidence in his resources and his resourcefulness, the world will look for a greater and more comprehensive work, when time shall have given ripeness and perspective to the views of the author's first period of scholarly productivity, the close of which these lectures mark. The book in its external form, which unites simplicity and neatness with ease of legibility, fittingly inaugurates the publication of the Sather Classical Lectures.

SAMUEL E. BASSETT.

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

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La Loi de Hiéron et les Romains. Par JÉRÔME CARCOPINO.  
Paris, E. de Boccard, 1919. 22 + 308 pp. 8°.

French erudition has made an important contribution to the history of Roman Law in M. Jérôme Carcopino's book on the *lex Hieronica*. Three studies of this law are, it is true, already in existence. But that of Degenkolb, written too early to utilize papyrological discoveries, saw in the *lex Hieronica* a purely Roman piece of legislation. Those of Rostowzew<sup>1</sup> and of

<sup>1</sup> Rostowzew, *Studien zur Geschichte des röm. Kolonates*, 1910, p. 233.



Wilcken<sup>2</sup> grafted it upon the revenue laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

The fundamental contribution of M. Carcopino's work consists in the proof that the *lex Hieronica* is purely Sicilian in its nature and was utilized by the Romans after their occupation. Altho this thesis appears to have been cursorily noticed by Wilcken (1901) and Rostowzew (1903), it is first established here. The law, according to Carcopino, dates from Hiero II, who, it appears, did not himself create the tithe, but simply settled the form of a preëxisting tax that had been simultaneously established in Greek Sicily and Carthage in Gelon's time to meet similar financial needs.

The argument is essentially based on the *De Frumento*—the third book of the *Actio Secunda in Verrem*. It is precisely this oration of Cicero that has been most neglected, and it is no small merit to have discovered what can be drawn from these pleadings, and to have actually analyzed them so profoundly that all future explanations of the *De Frumento* will have to be based on that of M. Carcopino.

With remarkable critical power the author, in a work of 300 pages, traces the origin and practice of the law, its deformation under Roman rule, its utilization by Verres, and the consequences which such an application actually had in Sicily.

Three new theories appear to deserve especial mention. The first asserts that Sicily, instead of being, as previously believed, the promised land of the Roman tithe-farmers' societies was, on the contrary, a country where their activities were prohibited. The *adjudicatio* at Syracuse excluded by law the tithe-farming companies formed at Rome. A remarkable point in the course of this argument is the demonstration by the author that the classical opinion on the subject—formulated principally by M. Delorme and by M. Belot<sup>3</sup>—is based on an erroneous confusion of the publicans of small means who requisitioned wheat in person (referred to as *decumani* by Cicero in Book III) with the powerful publicans of the equestrian order (also referred to as *decumani* in Book II).<sup>4</sup>

Carcopino's second novel theory penetrates even more deeply into the heart of the law and reaches a subject which has occupied many jurists.<sup>5</sup> He proves in regard to the legal procedure in taxation that the *legis actio per pignoris capionem*, instead of being in common use in 73 B. C., as was usually thought, was established in Sicily on the isolated initiative of Verres at

<sup>2</sup> Wilcken, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1897, col. 1015.

<sup>3</sup> *Histoire des Chevaliers Romains*, II, 177.

<sup>4</sup> See J. Carcopino, *Decumani*, pp. 401-442.

<sup>5</sup> Collinet, *Saisie privée*; Trapenard, *Ager scripturarius*; Degenkolb, *Die Lex Hieronica und das Pfändungsrecht der Pächter*.



a time when it was falling into desuetude at Rome. Taking as a basis the text of Gaius (IV 30), the author shows that the *lex Aebutia* abolished the *manus injectio*. In this connection, he exposes the weakness of the contrary argument, founded on the *senatusconsultum de pago Montano*, the date of which is uncertain, and which appears to be merely a corollary of the power of coercion of the magistrate. On the one hand, we do not find any authentic examples of the *manus injectio* after 126 B. C.; on the other hand, eighteen years after the *lex Aebutia*, the publicans had already given up the *pignoris capio* and had recourse to the formulary procedure, as is shown by the fact that the agrarian law of 111 B. C. ordered the magistrates to designate the *recuperatores* to examine into the claims formulated by the publicans.<sup>6</sup> And as the formulary procedure had come from the province to Rome at the time when the charter of Sicily was accorded, it is hardly probable that the *pignoris capio* was transplanted to Sicily where it had no root and where it was repugnant to the spirit of the *lex Hieronica* which recognized the right of both cultivators and tithe-farmers to appear as plaintiffs. M. Carcopino sees a definite confirmation of this theory in the text of Cicero's *Actio Secunda in Verrem*, III 11, 27, of which he gives a very accurate interpretation.

Thirdly, the book renders a great service in sweeping aside a firmly established error. All the commentators of the *Actiones in Verrem* from Zumpt<sup>7</sup> and all historians since Marquardt,<sup>8</sup> Dareste<sup>9</sup> and P. F. Girard,<sup>10</sup> divided the Sicilian *civitates* into two classes—the *decumanae civitates* (34 or 35 in number), subject to the *lex Hieronica*, and the *civitates* of the *ager publicus*, subject to the tithe. M. Carcopino demonstrates that the fact that a city belongs to the *ager publicus* does not in the least exempt it from submission to the collection of tithes. (He gives a specific proof of it for the city of Leontini.) The *ager publicus* is scattered through all the *civitates*, but no city (except Leontini) is totally incorporated in the Roman *ager publicus*.

In addition to propounding and establishing the new views described in the three preceding paragraphs, M. Carcopino clears up many doubtful points and corrects many current minor errors. He also presents a complete study of the *frumentum emptum*, on which only vague and brief statements were heretofore to be found.

<sup>6</sup> P. F. Girard, *Textes*,<sup>4</sup> pp. 46 sqq.

<sup>7</sup> Edition of *In Verrem*, p. 437.

<sup>8</sup> *Organisation de l'Empire*, II, p. 53.

<sup>9</sup> *De conditione et forma Siciliae*, pp. 32-34.

<sup>10</sup> *Organisation judiciaire des Romains*, p. 330, n. 1.

There is perhaps one criticism that one might make of the work. It does not delve sufficiently into the sources of the *lex Hieronica*. After having shown the numerous analogies between the *lex Hieronica* and the financial laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus enacted six years after the death of Arsinoë,—that is to say in 265/264 B. C.—the author concludes somewhat prematurely (p. 64): “Le nombre et la fidélité des ressemblances que nous venons de constater excluent l’hypothèse d’une source commune, d’un νόμος τελωνικός de la Grèce propre, dont les Grecs installés en Egypte depuis cinquante ans auraient pu, soudain et à la même date, s’inspirer indépendamment les uns des autres. Au contraire, l’idée d’une imitation directe est confirmée par l’histoire.” M. Carcopino then recounts the numerous relations existing at this time between the Sicilians and the Egyptians; and, after proving that the law of Ptolemy was anterior to the *lex Hieronica*, he concludes that the second is an imitation of the first. But from the similarity of the two laws, it is just as possible to induce a common origin for the two as a direct imitation of the one by the other, and the historical argument is not conclusive in favor of either hypothesis since the Sicilians were in as close relations with the Greeks as with the Egyptians, and certainly the Greek influence in Sicily was stronger than the Egyptian. Even supposing that there was a direct influence of the law of Ptolemy on that of Hiero, this does not at all exclude the other hypothesis. While making use of the original model was it not possible to adopt certain happy and recent modifications? M. Carcopino leaves this question unanswered.

PIERRE LEPAULLE.

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.

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La Table Hypothécaire de Veleia: Étude sur la Propriété Foncière dans l'Apennin de Plaisance. Par F. G. DE PACHTERE. Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1920. (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 228). xx + 120 pp.

DE PACHTERE has succeeded in extracting a remarkable amount of valuable information from the famous Veleian inscription. In the first two chapters he shows that Mommsen's conclusions (Hermes, xix, 363 ff.) were partly incorrect, partly inadequate. By tracing with unusual acumen the limits of many of the *pagi* mentioned in the inscription he demonstrates that the districts named are largely mountainous and that it is chiefly in the infertile and rocky regions, not in the lowlands, that small holdings gave way to latifundia. In the fertile regions, the small plots survived more successfully than Mommsen supposed.

A careful examination of the names of the original plots and of the possessors of Trajan's day shows that the earlier owners in the mountains were largely Ligurians and Celts and that these were replaced to a considerable extent by Latin immigrants (Veleia was not a colony) and by freedmen bearing Greek and Oriental names. In fact some of the wealthiest landlords of Trajan's day prove to have been of this latter class. Persicus, for instance, had accumulated a plantation of what once made up twenty-five different plots.

In chapter VII *DE PACHTERE* proves that after 102 A. D. the emperor's commissioners allowed to owners 8.05% of the value of estates in rural credits. By establishing this fact he is able to make a dozen simple and convincing emendations of the numerals on the stone: e. g. in item IV he changes L to V; in item V he writes L for I, etc. He then shows that the credits were assigned on the basis of the estimated values of the whole estate in each case, and that the separate values of parcels of estates, which often give a different sum-total, have nothing to do with the assignment of credits. Such values are merely records of the last previous selling-price and are retained on the document to serve as a basis for future estimates of liabilities to the state in case the parcels should again change hands.

These are only a few of the many discoveries that *DE PACHTERE* has made. The essay is one of the keenest studies that we have recently had in the domain of Roman history and will probably be the final word on most of the questions raised by the Veleian inscriptions. The young author, who had he lived would undoubtedly have become a leader in historical research, fell at the head of his troops on the Salonica front in September, 1916.

TENNEY FRANK.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

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Un Correspondant de Cicéron: Ap. Claudius Pulcher. Par L. A. CONSTANS. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1921. Pp. vi + 138.

Appius Claudius, the father-in-law of Brutus, was a very ordinary Roman patrician who reached the consulship (54 B. C.) and censorship solely by virtue of his ancestry. We should have little knowledge of him had he not crossed Cicero's path. As a brother of the infamous Clodius he had several opportunities to do Cicero harm, and as Cicero's predecessor in the governorship of Cilicia he caused mischief to the provincials that Cicero had to repair. It is probable that M. CONSTANS

chose this man as subject of a study not because of the significance of the man but because Cicero's speeches and correspondence contained a mass of material available for a study. His biography is indeed fair and judicious, but it adds nothing new to our knowledge of the period. Where a careful analysis of Cicero's letters might have offered some new results, as for instance in the treatment of the Salaminians by the agents of Brutus, CONSTANS (p. 92) follows the unsatisfactory traditional accounts without question.

TENNEY FRANK.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

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A Lithuanian Etymological Index. Based upon Brugmann's Grundriss and the etymological dictionaries of Uhlenbeck (Sanskrit), Kluge (German), Feist (Gothic), Berneker (Slavic), Walde (Latin), and Boisacq (Greek). By HAROLD H. BENDER, Ph. D.

Anyone who, like the reviewer, occasionally offers a course in Lithuanian for students of comparative philology, knows what a handicap it is that there is no etymological dictionary of the language and how much time is consumed in hunting down the scattered etymological discussions which include Lithuanian words. While Professor Bender does not as yet give us the desired etymological dictionary of Lithuanian, the Etymological Index is a most welcome aid, with its systematic exploitation of Brugmann's Grundriss and selected etymological dictionaries of other Indo-European languages. For without doubt the great majority of Lithuanian etymologies that are obviously correct or reasonably probable are to be found in one or another of these works, and with the aid of the Index can be located at once.

In the selection of etymological dictionaries to be cited only the choice for the Germanic group is at all doubtful. One might wish that in addition to Feist, and in place of Kluge, the fuller and more important Norwegian-Danish etymological dictionary of Falk and Torp, in the German edition of 1910, had been used. The fact that Berneker's *Slavisches Etymologisches Woerterbuch* has not progressed beyond *m* is a misfortune which makes the Index unbalanced in the matter of the many words that have clear cognates only in Slavic. For Slavic loanwords, too, the references to Brueckner, *Die slavischen Fremdwörter im Litauischen*, are apparently restricted to those words which find a place in the Index on account of their occurrence in the main works cited. Thus *migdala* 'almond' is included because it is mentioned by Berneker under *migdalū*, while *mislis* 'thought,' *mislýju* 'think,' which the beginner in

Lithuanian is sure to meet, are not given, as they doubtless would have been if Berneker had reached *myslū*. Leskien's *Ablaut der Wurzelsilben im Litauischen*, so invaluable for the internal etymological grouping, is freely cited, but inevitably, unless the Index were to more than double in volume, only for a selection of words—a selection which was bound to be embarrassing.

The limitation of the Index to words discussed in the specified works is occasionally broken through by the inclusion of derivatives of other indexed words (cf. the author's remark, p. 10), and such extension for the benefit of "those comparative students who are not at home in Lithuanian" might have been carried further to advantage. For example, the commonest conjunction for introducing subordinate clauses, *kād* 'that,' is not mentioned. Not every user of the Index will know that it is the same in origin as the *kadà* 'when,' which is included. For this and other conjunctions references to Leskien, *Litauische Partikeln und Konjunktionen*, IF. 14. 89, and E. Hermann, *Ueber die Entwicklung der litauischen Konjunktionsaetze*, would have been useful.

However, it is easier for the reviewer to suggest additions than for the author to decide where to draw the line. The Index is of great convenience as it stands, and if too generously augmented might have exceeded the justifiable expense of publication in this form. For a comprehensive work on Lithuanian etymology is obviously much better cast in the form of an etymological dictionary, with the etymologies actually given and references added, as in Walde or Boisacq. It is to be hoped that the author will sometime produce such a dictionary. The labor which he has devoted to the present work, especially the verification of form and meaning and the inclusion of many words not to be found in other dictionaries, will be all to the good. And it may be incidentally remarked that the facilities for verifying the present-day Lithuanian vocabulary are nowhere better than in this country, with its large Lithuanian population, representing every province and dialect, and its active Lithuanian press.

CARL D. BUCK.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

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Philological Quarterly. Volume I. January, 1922. Number 1. Published at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

It is a great pleasure to be able to announce to the readers of the Journal the appearance of a new quarterly in the field of philology. The broadness of scope implied in the title is limited by the apposition of the words "A Journal Devoted to



Scholarly Investigation in the Classical and Modern Languages and Literatures." The magazine is edited by Professor HARDIN CRAIG, of the University of Iowa, with the co-operation of Professors CHARLES BUNDY WILSON, BERTHOLD L. ULLMAN, THOMAS A. KNOTT, and CHARLES E. YOUNG, colleagues of Professor Craig at the same institution. In the present number, THOMAS A. KNOTT publishes an article (pp. 1-16) on "Chaucer's Anonymous Merchant." This is an interesting study of the social status of the merchant in Chaucer's day. B. L. ULLMAN (pp. 17-22) justifies the attribution of Corbeian provenience to Vatican MS 3864 (known as V for Pliny and Sallust, and as M or R for Caesar) by showing that this MS is referred to in early catalogs of the Library of Corbie. E. N. S. THOMPSON (pp. 23-30) discusses Farlie's "Kalendarium Humanae Vitae: The Kalender of Mans Life" (London, 1638), and compares it with Spenser's "Shepheards Calender" and Thomson's "Seasons." STARR WILLARD CUTTING (pp. 31-48) shows that, under the sway of pro-Prussianism, von Treitschke in his "Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert" has grossly misrepresented the *Turner* and *Burschenschafter* and that he has, at times, been guilty even of perverting his sources. HELEN SARD HUGHES (pp. 49-55) presents weighty reasons for regarding as the work of Henry Fielding the "Dialogue between a Beau's Head and his Heels, by Mr. Fielding" (printed by John Watts in *The Musical Miscellany*, London, 1729-31, Vol. VI). In an article entitled "La Fontaine's Imitation" (56-70) COLBERT SEARLES gives intimate glimpses of the inimitable art of La Fontaine's "Fables." JOHN S. KENYON (pp. 71-73) has a convincing note on the meaning of 'commend' in *Hamlet* I, ii, 39. Seven pages of book-reviews complete the number. The editors of the *Philological Quarterly* and the authorities of the University of Iowa deserve the congratulations, gratitude and good wishes of students of classical and modern languages and literatures.

C. W. E. MILLER.

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## CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT

1858-1921

In the death of Professor Charles Edwin Bennett, which occurred suddenly on May 2, 1921, the cause of classical scholarship sustained a severe loss. Professor Bennett was a thorough scholar and a great teacher. He possessed to an unusual degree the rare ability to understand and solve the difficulties of the student mind at whatever stage of advancement. To this fact was due in part the stimulus of his class-room at the University, and the overwhelming success of his text-books throughout the United States. He was profound enough in knowledge to be simple in exposition, and he showed wise discrimination in the treatment of essentials and non-essentials.

His first published book was his Latin Grammar, issued in 1895, and better known today, perhaps, to students of Latin in preparatory schools than any other one book. In connection with the Grammar appeared the Appendix, revised and republished in 1907 as *The Latin Language*. His last publication was the second volume of the *Syntax of Early Latin*, which appeared in 1914. The reception of the two volumes of this work by classical scholars on either side of the Atlantic bore abundant testimony to its value in the field of classical investigation, and won for the author a secure place among the foremost scholars of his day. He had it in mind to complete this work at some time by a third volume on *The Particles*; that this purpose was not carried out must always be to scholars a cause for deep regret. In the years intervening between the publication of the Grammar and the Early Syntax, he published his entire series of text-books for preparatory schools, and kept them abreast of the times by constant revision; he edited the Odes and Epodes of Horace, the *Dialogus of Tacitus*, Xenophon's *Hellenica* and the *De Amicitia* and *De Senectute*. He also collaborated with Professor G. P. Bristol in writing *The Teaching of Latin and Greek in Secondary Schools*, and with Professor W. A. Hammond in translating the *Characters of Theophrastus*. He translated for the Loeb Classical Library the Odes and Epodes of Horace, and later the *Strategemata* of Frontinus, which has not yet appeared. He was likewise for many years a frequent contributor to the classical periodicals of the country.

As a scholar, as a teacher, as a friend of rare charm and stimulus, he will long be missed by those who knew and loved him.

MARY B. McELWAIN.

SMITH COLLEGE,  
NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

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